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Introduction 
My motivation for embarking on this study of the historiography of Israel’s “New 
Historians”, was frankly the discovery of the level of misunderstandings, distortions 
and plain propaganda expressed by the pro-Israel lobby in Norway. During my 
studies at bachelor level at the University of Bergen, I was reading historical literature 
that contrasted the views expressed by what I call the “Christian Zionists” on many 
levels. Their views I knew intimately from an upbringing in a conservative Christian 
community, and from my teachers in upper secondary boarding school which was 
owned by the pro-Zionist Norwegian Lutheran Mission. These views were of course 
religiously inspired: - The creation of the modern state of Israel was the fulfillment of 
the ancient prophecies in the Bible, and the Jewish victory in the 1948 “War of 
Independence” was a miracle only possible by divine intervention. The Jews could 
not be blamed for the Palestinian refugee problem, and the fault for the continuant 
conflict lay solely on the Arabs.  
However, at the same boarding school I was also introduced to the plight of the 
Palestinian people through a newfound friend with a Marxist background. He told me 
about Palestinian children being tortured in prison after throwing rocks at Israeli 
soldiers, and enlightened me on the Israeli-Palistini death toll-ratio during the first 
Palestinian intifada. I started to question the blind support for Israel amongst my 
teachers and other conservative Christian authorities, and donned a red keffiyeh, a 
Palestinian headscarf as a symbol of support for the Palestinian case (this was 
before it became a fashion and lost all political denotation, and us wearing them 
raised heads at the conservative Christian boarding school).  
My adolescence rebellion aside, understanding that there was more than one side of 
the conflict was more than many in my surroundings were able to do. I grew tired of 
endless discussions (of which there were many) about who was guilty of what in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and decided to study the question in more depth at the 
University of Bergen. I wrote a paper on the Oslo peace-process as a conclusion of 
my bachelor degree, and discovered that there were a lot of discrepancies between 
the official Israeli narrative expressed by the diplomats of the Israeli foreign office, 
and the historiography of Israeli historians recommended as credible sources by the 
University. I found this discrepancy intriguing, and understood more of why pro-
Zionists in Norway and elsewhere could continue expressing a long since debunked 
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mythology of the birth of Israel. They simply reproduced the propaganda they were 
being fed by the Israeli foreign relations officials. Why Israeli officials believe that it is 
in their best interest to present half-truths and sometimes blatant lies to the Western 
audiences could be a whole other research project. My interest has been to try to 
understand why the Israeli historians who are known as the New Historians have not 
been able to change the paradigm of the official Zionist narrative.   
I believe that my research is significant for the following reasons:  
One: There is a paucity of scholars outside Israel who work in the field of Israeli 
historiography, and those who do often fail to steer clear of the political polarization 
due to the Arab-Israeli conflict:1    
“The attribution of responsibility in an ethnic conflict such as that between 
Israelis and Palestinians, entirely to one of the antagonists is a product of 
volition and filtered cognition, an assertion by the will more than an exercise of 
judgment. Operating in unintended symmetry, champions and revilers of Israel 
have constructed historical narratives that free their constituencies of 
accountability for their actions. The normalization of Israeli historiography 
demands removing it from the framework of competitive victimhood.”1  
Any contribution from outsiders who manages to avoid the pitfalls of victimization of 
one of the parties, is potentially an important one. Standing with one foot in both the 
Christian conservative camp, as well as the left-wing pro-Palestinian camp, I hope I 
have been able to address this question with the balance required. I know the history 
of the Holocaust and respect the unique situation of the Jewish people in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. At the same time I know and respect the history 
of the Palestinian Nakba, the origin of the Palestinian refugee problem. If my thesis is 
found unsatisfactionary by advocates from both parties, I might still have found the 
right balance.  
Two: The palpable existence of a mythology surrounding the birth of Israel is not a 
viable status quo for the historical understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict. My 
                                            
1
 Penslar, Derek J. (2007). Israel in History. New York, Routledge.  
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position is that all myths must be debunked and holy cows slaughtered. In this case, 
this is especially important as the existence of myths might be blocking the road 
towards a finalized peace treaty between the Israelis and the Palestinian people. 
There must exist a common perception of what happened in 1947-1948 if the parties 
shall be able to agree on how to deal with the Palestinian refugee problem. My hope 
is that this thesis will help to cast a light on the historiography of the conflict, and thus 
be a small contribution to establishing a commonly accepted perception of the 
history. 
This master thesis is divided in five chapters in addition to the introduction and the 
conclusion. The first chapter is a short historical background that serves as an 
introduction to the history of Palestine and Israel. The second chapter is an overview 
of the historiography of Israel, or more precisely the historiography on the state of 
Israel by Israeli historians, as well as containing a short overview of a selection of 
Palestinian historians and their writings on the Nakba. Thus I am able to place the 
writings of the New Historians in the historiographical context. The third chapter 
contains a short biography of each of the New Historians reaching up until the 
emergence of the New Historiography as a phenomenon in the late 1980s. It also 
contains an overview of the political and historiographical developments that affected 
the development of the New Historiography. This is vital in understanding how such a 
unique new perspective could emerge. In chapter four I present an overview of the 
main themes and findings of the New Historians, as well as a discussion on the 
methodology employed by the New Historians and their underlying ideologies. In 
chapter five I explore the personal repercussions experienced by the New Historians 
as a consequence of the controversies surrounding their findings, as well as the 
political and historiographical consequences of the New Historiography.     
Finally: This master thesis does not follow the normal approach of such thesis, in that 
it is not a historical research of a period or an event, but rather a historiographical 
research – a survey of the historiography of a certain group of historians. The 
methodology of this thesis thus differs somewhat from other history master thesis. 
Furay and Salevouris (1988) define historiography as "the study of the way history 
has been and is written — the history of historical writing... When you study 
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'historiography' you do not study the events of the past directly, but the changing 
interpretations of those events in the works of individual historians."2 As a 
historiographer I want to capture the essence of a selected historian or history writing 
of a certain era. I also need to place the selected historiography in its context, and 
explain the catalysts for the development of different historiographical approaches. 
The most important reason for doing historiographical research is being able to 
explain how not only history itself, but also the history-writing can shape and change 
a nation. An example of such a work is Q. Edward Wang’s book, Inventing China 
through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography (2001)3.  
For a historiographical work, this master thesis has a narrow perspective. I focus on 
four books from four historians published in 1987 and 1988 which were the 
foundation of the New Historiography of Israel. These will be presented in chapter 
two.  
Research Questions 
In developing the master thesis, I found that formulating precise research questions 
helped focus my reading. However, the thesis goes beyond the framework of these 
questions, which I have attempted to answer in the conclusion.   
Research question one: What is new in the historiography of the New Historians?  
Why were they called “the New Historians”? What is new about them? These are the 
questions I have attempted to answer in the thesis. It is an essential question, as it 
goes to the core of the debate between the Israeli historians of the different 
traditions. My thesis will show that than writing “new history” as the term is known 
from the historiographical trend of nouvelle historique in France, the so-called New 
Historians (I will still use this term all though the thesis) really are classical 
                                            
2
 From Furay and Salevouris (1988) The Methods and Skills of History: A Practical Guide. Referred in 
an article on Wikipedia. URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historiography. Retrieved: 13.11.12 
3
 Referred to in George G. Iggers and Q. Edward Wang’s (2008), A Global History of Modern 
Historiography. Pearson Education Limited, Great Britain. (Page X).  
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revisionists which have freed themselves from the paradigm of the Zionist 
historiography of Israel. 
Research question two: Why did the historiography of the New Historians cause such 
fierce reactions?  
Yes indeed, why? Because the reactions have evidently been fierce, and the debate 
has been heated if not even a hateful one. One New Historian has been forced into 
exile, while another has conceded from many of his previous views. My thesis will 
show that a combination of the New Historiography having a real impact on the 
politics of peace-negotiations, as well as the indignation of Zionist historians which 
indirectly were discredited by the New Historians, fueled the criticism.   
These questions have helped me keeping to a certain line of research, but a third 
question has always been the main focus of my thesis:  
Research question three: Why was the New Historians unsuccessful in changing the 
paradigm of the official version of the birth of Israel?  
The answer to this question is found within the mentality of the Israeli society. - A 
mentality that has been changing over the years, and has been drastically affected 
by the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. The paradigm of Israel historiography 
was shifting during the 1990s, opening for new historical interpretations. But the 
collapse of the Camp David agreement in 2000 and the following second intifada 
shifted the Israeli society markedly to the right, which effectively was the end of 
accommodation to the historiography of the New Historians.  
Chapter 1: Historical Background 
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an overview of the long lines of the 
history of Israel up to the first Arab-Israeli war 1947-1949, and by this establishing a 
common ground of understanding about the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
historiography that deals with this conflict. The sources used in this chapter are 
mostly academic secondary literature, and the chapter is written in an effort to avoid 
any pitfalls of controversy.   
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Mandate period 
The League of Nations approved the establishment of the mandate of Palestine in 
June 1922 in the aftermath of the British conquest of the southern Ottoman Middle 
East during World War I. The mandate came to effect September 29th 1923. Even 
before the establishment of the mandate, the Zionist movement founded by 
Theodore Herzl, had facilitated mass immigration of Jews into Palestine. These 
waves of immigration known as the “aliyahs” (Hebrew, meaning “ascend”), were a 
part of the Zionist plan to found a national home for Jews from all over the world in 
Palestine in accordance with the Balfour-declaration (see figure 1, next page).4 
Pogroms5 in Russia, and political persecution of Jews in Western Europe6 
accelerated the exodus of European Jewry.  
 
                                            
4
 Cleveland, W. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 244, 254) 
5
 Violent riots targeting Jews in cities all over the vast Russian empire 
6
 See the “Dreyfus affair”. URL: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/Dreyfus.html 
retrieved 18.09.12 
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Figure 1. 
Jewish Immigration 
Although European Jews in much larger numbers immigrated to Western countries 
such as Great Britain and The United States, thousands of Jews settled at the 
beaches of The Palestine Mediterranean Coast. This led to a series of conflicts and 
civil war between Jews, Arabs and the British during the mandate period, most 
notably the Arab revolt in 1936-39 which was violently brought down by the British 
troops assisted by Jewish militia7.8 The Arabs felt betrayed by the British, who had 
given the leaders of the Arab uprising against the Turks during the World War I, 
promises of Arab sovereignty in Arab-speaking parts of the former Ottoman Empire).9 
In an attempt to appease the Arab population of Palestine, the British authorities tried 
to restrict the immigration of Jews to Palestine. This policy was a part of the 
MacDonald White Paper of 193910 which also declared that the British obligations to 
the Jews in the Balfour declaration were fulfilled now that 450.000 Jews lived within 
the boundaries of the mandate of Palestine. Further on, that the British could not 
accept the establishment of a Jewish state which left the Arab population as Jewish 
subjects, as this would be in conflict with the promises made to the Hashemites11.  
 
"His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the 
Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be 
converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. 
[...] His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part 
of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed 
regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to 
the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab 
                                            
7
 The Jewish militia was called Haganah, Hebrew for defense.  
8
 Cleveland, W. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 260) 
9
 Cleveland, W. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 158) 
10
 Named after Malcolm MacDonald, The British Colonial Secretary who presided over it.  
11
 The Arab dynasty of King Hussain of the Hijaz and his descendants.  
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population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their 
will.”12 
The Second World War 
Shortly after the White Paper policies were enacted, the World War II broke out. The 
Zionists leader, David Ben-Gurion ushered militiamen from the Yishuv13 to join the 
fighting on the British side against the Nazis, proclaiming: “We must support the 
(British) army as though there were no White Paper, and fight the White Paper as 
though there were no war.”14 While thousands of Jewish volunteers went to fight on 
the British side, the Zionist organizations undermined the White Paper policies to limit 
Jewish immigration to Palestine. In open defiance of the British policies, the Jewish 
Agency15 hired ships to ship Jews out of southern Europe landing them on the shores 
of Tel Aviv, trying to bring as many Jews as possible to safety in Palestine away from 
the atrocities and genocide that was going on in Nazi Occupied Europe.16  
However, the feeling of injustice in the policies of the British White Paper of 1939 was 
not forgotten in the turmoil of the war. If anything, the resentment toward the British 
policy of limiting the number of Jewish immigrants only grew as the reports from the 
concentration-caps arrived after their liberation at the end of the war. Although Ben-
Gurion wanted to wait the war out before confronting the British and claiming 
independence, not everybody had his patience. Lehi17, an offshoot of Irgun18; the 
                                            
12
 Webpage: The Avalon Project, Yale. British White Paper of 1939. URL: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1939.asp, retrieved 18.09.12 
13
 Hebrew: referring to the body of Jewish residents in Palestine, before the establishment of the State 
of Israel 
14
 Teveth, S. (1987), Ben-Gurion: The Burning Ground, 1886–1948, Houghton Mifflin 
15
 The pre-state Zionist leadership of the Yishuv led by David Ben-Gurion. 
16
 Cleveland, W. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 262) 
17
 Formally Loḥamei Ḥerut Yisraʾel Hebrew: Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, (also called the Stern-
gang.  Zionist extremist organization in Palestine, founded in 1940 by Avraham Stern (1907–42) after 
a split in the right-wing underground movement Irgun Zvai Leumi. Encyclopedia Britannica. 
18
 Irgun Zvai Leumi, Hebrew: National Military Organization. Founded in 1931. (Encyclopedia 
Britannica.) 
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militia organization of the Zionist Revisionist19,  were targeting British officials during 
wartime, and in 1944 they assassinated the British minister of state for the Middle 
East, Lord Moyne. The largest and most efficient of the oppositional groups: Irgun 
had called off their operations against the British government during the Second 
World War.20  
Post-war conflict 
However, this campaign was commenced again after the capitulation of Nazi-
Germany, when Irgun carried out a series of bombings; including the 1946 bombing 
of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem which served as headquarter for the British 
administration in Palestine. 91 people were killed, including 28 high-ranking British 
officials and other British citizens.21 At the end of the World War II in 1945, the 
Jewish Agency had also joined the conflict. Its military wing: Haganah22, executed a 
number of successful sabotage missions targeting British communications in 
Palestine. This volatile situation convinced Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of 
Britain, that they had lost control of the situation in Palestine. He then referred the 
matter to the United Nations for a resolution. This led to hectic diplomacy in the UN-
system that ended up with the creation of the United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) by the General Assembly.23  
 
 
 
                                            
19
 Zionist revisionism was the right-wing opposition of the mainstream political Zionism, which was 
represented by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jobotinsky, and later Menachem Begin. The revisionist wanted a more 
radical approach in dealing with the British mandate policies, and strived for an independent state with 
Jewish majorities on both banks of the river Jordan. Zionist revisionism was the forerunner to the 
political parties of Herut and Likud. Source: Jewish Virtual Library. URL: 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/Revisionist_Zionism.html, retrieved 22.09.12 
20
 Shlaim, Avi (2009): Israel and Palestine. London, Verso.  
21
 Webpage: Israel National News, 2008. URL : 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/126929#.UFxR9I2Tuts retrieved 21.09.12 
22
 Hebrew, meaning: defense. A paramilitary organization established by the Jewish Agency in the 
mandate period. In 1948, it was transformed into the Israeli Defense Force.  
23
 Cleveland, W. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 263-265) 
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The first Arab-Israeli war 1947-1949 
UNSCOP came thus in 1947 up with a plan to grant independence from Britain to 
Palestine, and to divide the mandate in two roughly equal parts designated to a 
Jewish, and a Arab-Palestinian state. Being the minority and striving for the 
development of a Jewish state in Palestine, the Jewish Agency accepted the partition 
plan, while the Arab leaders mainly rejected it. The UNSCOP proposal was passed in 
the General Assembly after intense lobbying and pressure by the US President 
Truman and his administration.24    
However, The British refused to assist UNSCOP in implementing the partition plan, 
and announced that they would be leaving the mandate by May 15th 1948. This was 
even before the vote in the General Assembly. The result was that Palestine was 
plunged into chaos, beginning with Arab protests and riots against the partition plan 
in 1947, and intensifying as the Haganah launched a campaign to secure all the 
areas designated to a Jewish state by the UNSCOP partition-plan. This resulted in an 
intercommunal war between Jews and Arabs over the control of the former 
mandate.25 After the declaration of the Jewish state in 1948 following the British 
withdrawal, five neighboring Arab countries joined the fighting.26 Their efforts were 
with one exception27 fruitless, as the Jews emerged victorious. For the Jews, this is 
the “War of Independence”, for the Palestinian Arabs, it’s known as al Nakba, 
meaning “the catastrophe”.28 Upon leaving the mandate in 1948, the British 
reluctantly accepted the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel by the Zionist 
movement, but also supported the Arab-Hashemite kingdom of Jordan in securing 
parts of the Palestine mandate under the crown of King Abdullah.29 The West Bank 
of Jordan was under the Hashemites from the end of hostilities in 1949, until the six-
                                            
24
 Cleveland, W. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 264) 
25
 Cleveland, W. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 263-265) 
26
 These were Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.  
27
 The goal of the Arab Legion of Jordan, was not the total defeat of the Jewish forces, but rather to 
secure the most of the areas designated to an Palestinian-Arab state by the UNSCOP partition plan. In 
securing the West-Bank and the Old Town of Jerusalem, their campaign was successful.  
28
 Cleveland, W. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 267) 
29
 Shlaim, Avi. Interview. Oxford 29. May 2012.   
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day war in 1967, when it was occupied by Israel. Effectively hindering any hope of 
establishing a sovereign Palestinian state.30   The Palestinian-Arabs, who were 
promised a nation-state of their own by the United Nations, got the worst of it. More 
than 700.000 were displaced as a result of the conflict, and the people were divided 
between the new states of Israel and Jordan, as well as other countries.31 They have 
fought ever since for the right to return and the establishment of a sovereign 
Palestinian state.  
As the historiographical narratives of this conflict are the main theme of this thesis, 
more aspects of this war will be covered in depth later in the thesis where I will 
discuss the discrepancies between the Zionist historiography and the New 
Historiography concerning the factual circumstances of the war.   
Chapter 2: Israeli Historiography  
This chapter consists of an overview of Israeli historiography, as well as an 
introduction to the New Historians. In trying to explain what is new in the 
historiography, I will first need to establish what the characteristics of the old 
historiography were.  
In the years following 1948, the Jewish and Palestinian history-writing represented 
two distinct narratives, in which the different versions were so far apart, it was 
obvious that not both could be true. In Israel during the decades after the 
independence, the Palestinians were perceived as the enemies, and their 
perspective was given little space in the Israeli public debate. It was the official 
narrative that was repeated and supported, which described Israel as the dove who 
was forced to carry a sword.32 Israel was the righteous and triumphant newborn state 
which had emerged victorious as the David versus the Arab Goliath. However, 
opposition to this narrative had always existed. Ultra-orthodox Sephardic Jews had 
opposed Zionism as a political ideology for decades preceding the independence in 
                                            
30 Shlaim, Avi (1988): Collusion across the Jordan. New York, Colombia University Press. (p. 613) 
31 Cleveland, W. (2004): A History of the Modern Middle East. Oxford, Westview press.  (p. 268-270) 
32
 See Shapira, Anita (1991). The Sword of the Dove (Land and Power. The Zionist Resort to force, 
1881 – 1948). Stanford, California. Stanford University Press. 
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1948, and groups of moderate Marxists had advocated a secular state for Jews and 
Arabs alike. But it was not until the emergence of New History in the late 1980-ies, 
that the Zionist narrative was challenged in a way that managed to shake the very 
foundations of Israeli self-image. 
Establishing the group 
The term New Historians was first coined by the former Israeli journalist turned 
historian Benny Morris. He wanted to describe a new generation of historians who 
looked afresh at the Israeli historical experience, and which conclusions were often at 
odds with those of the old history, meaning the official Zionist and/or patriotic 
historiography from the post-1948 era. The term was first used in the essay: “The 
New Historiography” (published in 1988 in “Tikkun”)33. In this essay Morris claims that 
the old or official historiography tended to omit or distort facts that were unfavorable 
to the young Jewish state. The New Historians wanted to look behind the veils of 
propaganda and investigate the records from the 1948 conflict anew to present a 
more truthful version of the history of Israel and Palestine.34 This article served to 
raise a whole lot of attention to Morris’ book The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee 
Problem, which had until then not raised many heads. Now, this book got all the 
attention it deserved, as well as the other works of the New Historians.35 Morris has 
later accredited the need of belonging to a community of historians with similar views, 
as the reason for establishing the group, as he was faced with the onslaught of 
criticism from the influential MAPAI36 old guard. Whoever Morris regarded as being 
part of the group of New Historians changed through the years with his sympathies 
and antipathies. Before I dive deeper into the material of the New Historians, I will 
give an overview of the preceding historiography of Israel, or as Morris would call it: 
The old history.  
                                            
33
 Later published in the collection of esseys: Morris, B. (1990) 1948 and after, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press.  
34
 Morris, Benny (1990). 1948 and after. Oxford, Clarendon Press. (p. 6) 
35
 Shapira, Anita. “The Past is not a Foreign Country.” The New Republic. 12.01.2000 URL: 
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/courses01/rrtw/Shapira.htm Retrieved 18.10.12 
36
 Hebrew abbreviation of  Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael.  Lit. United Workers Part Workers' Party of 
the Land of Israely. MAPAI was the forerunner to the Israeli Labor Party.  
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The Zionist historiography 
In the years following independence, the historiography was focused on nation 
building, rather than fact-finding. The Israeli leaders used the Zionist perspective to 
explain the establishment of the state of Israel as the Jewish people destined 
homeland, and the climax of the history of the Jewish diaspora. To improve the 
demographic situation versus the Arabs of Palestine, Israel needed mass 
immigration. Most Jews that were living in Arab countries left their homes for the new 
Jewish nation. Some took heed of the Israeli call to unite all Jews in the land of Israel, 
while others were forcibly driven out of the Arab lands. These joined the European 
Jews who had dominated the Yishuv. The difficulty was how to make one nation of 
groups of diverse ethnicity and culture who really only was united by religion. In 
forging the Israeli nation, the Hebrew language was reinvented and government 
institutions such as the coinage and the army were filled with ancient Jewish 
symbols. The early historiography also needed to fulfill this national agenda.     
David Ben-Gurion 
David Ben-Gurion, (born 1886 in Poland, died 1973 in Israel) was a Zionist leader 
during the mandate period, legendary founder of Israel (1948)37, and the first prime 
minister of Israel.38 He wrote several books and ‘histories’ of the Yishuv and of the 
first years of Israel. Amongst these were Rebirth and destiny of Israel, (1954) 
Memoirs, (1970) Israel, a personal story, (1972) and My Talks With Arab Leaders 
(1973)39 These became the hallmark and authority of Zionist history, though not 
historical works in the academic sense, but more as an expression of a historical will; 
The history of the idea of Israel. One of the reoccurring themes in Ben-Gurion’s 
books was the notion that the Israeli leaders were desperate to find peace with their 
Arab neighbors, but met only uncompromising hostility from the Arabs, who had their 
mind set on the destruction of Israel.39 In Ben-Gurion’s memoirs, he expresses an 
anxiety for the annihilation of Israel as a whole at the hand of the Arabs. It is clear 
                                            
37
 Shlaim, Avi. “Ben Gurion revisited”, a review of David Ben-Gurion’s, Medinat Yisrael, veHaolam 
ha'Aravi, 1949-1956 (David Ben-Gurion, the State of Israel, and the Arab World, 1949-1956) by Zaki 
Shalom. Journal of Palestine studies, Vol. 25, nr. 4, summer 1996. 
38
 Elected prime minister in February 1948, resigned in 1954 after the Qibya massacre, back as prime 
minister in 1955 until 1963.  
39
 Morris, B. (1990). 1948 and after. Oxford, Clarendon Press. (p. 5) 
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that this gloomy worldview caused a lot of distrust towards the Arab leaders, and 
must have colored his opinions of Arab receptions to Israeli peace-attempts.37  
Netanel Lorch  
Another influential Zionist history-writer was Lt. Col. Netanel Lorch (1925-1997). The 
ambassador and former Secretary General of the Knesset40, was the founder of the 
IDF41’s historical division, and the author of The Edge of the Sword. Israel’s War of 
Independence, 1947-194942 (Putnam’s, 1961)43. He also was a representative of the 
establishment, writing a nationalist narrative. He described the history of 1948 as a 
heroic conflict, depicting the Israeli David versus the Arab Goliath. The desperate 
battle of survival for Israel with its back against the wall. For Lorch, the moral 
perspective was important. That the IDF held the moral high ground and had higher 
ethical standards than their Arab neighbors. In the IDF there had been a tradition of 
Tohar HaNeshek or the purity of arms. Simply put was it the idea that the army was 
only used for defense, never for offensive purposes. While explaining the exodus of 
the Palestinians from Lydda, Lorch states: “The residents, who had violated 
surrender terms and feared retribution, declared they would leave and asked for safe 
conduct to Arab Legion lines, which was granted.”44 This accord stand in contrast 
from what we know from more recent historiography in which we are told that Lydda 
was the scene of the killing of 250 Arabs after the town was in Israeli hands, many of 
them POWs45.46 Books as The Edge of the Sword were important in the building of a 
moral self-image amongst the military forces, and further on the whole Israeli 
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society.47 The question of neutrality and historical value of these works must be seen 
in the context from which they were written. 
Chaim Herzog  
A third influential Zionist history-writer was Chaim Herzog, the sixth president of 
Israel (1983-1993). Born in Ireland in 1918 (died in Israel 1997), he emigrated to 
Palestine in 1935 where he served in the Haganah during the Arab revolt 1936-1939. 
He went on to fight in the British army during World War II, and participated in the 
liberation of concentration camps in Germany and Poland. He also participated in the 
first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 as an officer in the battles for Latrun.48 Later, as the 
Israeli ambassador to the UN (1975-1978), he famously argued against the General 
Assembly resolution labeling Zionism as a racist ideology.49 Herzog authored several 
historical works from the events that he had been involved in, including: Israel's 
Finest Hour (1967); Days of Awe (1973); The War of Atonement (1975); a 
compilation of his UN speeches: Who stands accused?: Israel answers its critics. 
(1978); The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of 
Independence through Lebanon (1982).  
These historians have in common that they were all establishment figures, writing a 
nationalist narrative of Israel’s history.50 Thus it’s safe to say that the Zionist history-
writers offered explanations that were self-serving or at least represented nationalist 
views. As an Israeli historian in the volatile post-1948 era with continuous border 
wars, it is understandable that blackening the Israeli reputation was regarded as 
unpatriotic, or even treacherous. After all, the war was a propaganda war as well as a 
military struggle, and the Israeli leadership was dependent on the support of the 
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western government, as well as the Jewish diaspora and Christian communities.51 It 
is understandable that in this environment, no historian with any ambitions dared 
challenge the “fathers” of the nation, labeling them as liars. The result was that the 
history of 1948 was written not by rigorous historians, but by insiders and people from 
the establishment.52  
Other preceding historiography 
The Nakba historiography 
In the Palestinian community, the Nakba literature developed into a genre of its own. 
Historians such as Aref al-Aref (1892-1973), Sami Hadawia (1904-2004) and Walid 
Khalidi (born 1925) were significant in explaining the loss of the Palestinians during 
the Nakba to new generations of Palestinian exiles.53 Central works include: al-
Nakba: Nakbat Bayt al-Maqdis wal-firdaws al-mafqud (The catastrophe: The 
catastrophe of Jerusalem and the lost paradise) by Araf al-Aref, Palestine: Loss of a 
Heritage (1963), Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948 (1988) and Bitter Harvest: A 
Modern History of Palestine (1991) by Sami Hadawi and Why Did the Palestinians 
Leave? Middle East Forum, 24, 21–24, (July 1959)54, From Haven to Conquest: 
Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948. (1971), and All That 
Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 
(1992) by Walid Khalidi. However, as well as the Zionist historians, they too relied 
heavily on memories and memoirs, as well as oral testimonies from the refugees. 
They also have been criticized for not having the necessary objectivity and distance 
required for writing reliable history. In addition, the written sources were sparse, as 
the Arab countries military archives were closed (as is mostly the case still today). 
The Palestinian nation, being stateless and dispersed, lacked the institutions and 
resources to accumulate documentation and archival material of any authority. The 
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result is that there is no equivalent on the Palestinian or Arab side to the vast archival 
material of the Israelis.55 Rather ironically, only a relatively small number of 
Palestinian historians have researched the Nakba, leaving the field of academic 
discussion to the Israeli historians.55  
Socialist / Communist historiography  
Also, there were earlier challenges put towards the Zionist narrative from the Israeli 
far left and communist writers. In 1962, an anti-capitalist and anti-Zionist organization 
called Matzpen56 was founded by activists who had split from the Communist Party of 
Israel. Consisting of members of both Arab and Jewish ethnicity/heritage, they had a 
unique vantage point and were able to see the larger picture to a greater extent than 
Zionist-Israelis. This enabled them to express and put in print an alternate 
interpretation of the first Arab-Israeli conflict that preceded the conclusions of the 
New Historians by decades. Much of the writings of the far left was collected by Arie 
Boder and published in The Other Israel, The Radical Case against Zionism. 
(Doubleday, 1972).57 The downside was their Marxist views on history in which they 
interpreted the Arab-Israeli conflict into, seeing the Israeli-Arab conflict as the result 
of an imperialistic colonial project and ignoring the unique circumstances of the 
Jewish people in the aftermath of the Holocaust.  
- Israel Beer 
Another issue is the fact that they didn’t yet have access to the compelling archival 
evidence that was to be released several years later, and depended on the 
testimonies of eyewitnesses and   defectors such as former IDF Lt. Col. Israel Beer, 
who was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union. While in prison, Beer wrote the 
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book: The security of Israel, yesterday, today and tomorrow58. The book was a 
critique of the Labor Government and David Ben-Gurion in particular for colluding 
with reactionary forces in the Arab World like King Abdullah of Jordan against the 
Palestinians. In his opinion, Zionism was not a progressive force, but rather a 
reactionary force.59. Beers notions of collusion between King Abdullah and the 
Zionists, preceded the works on the subject by New Historians Ilan Pappé and Avi 
Shalim by 22 years. But his credibility as a convicted spy, and the fact that his entire 
given background and identity was fabricated, meant that his notions was probably 
not regarded as credible at the time.60 However, later Israeli historians such as Dan 
Schuefetan and Uri Bar-Joseph analyzed the material from Beer and wrote 
respectably A Jordanian Option (1986) and The Best of Enemies (1987) which was 
published before the year that the New Historians came out with their books (1988)61 
These works however did not generate the same national and international attention 
nor controversy as the concurrent works of the New Historians. 
Revised Labor-Zionist historiography  
Following the years of the independence, numerous universities were established all 
over the country.62 In addition, by the mid-1960s the founding generations of the 
Yishuv were passing. According to Israeli Historian Israel Kolatt in an essay printed in 
the first issue of “Cathedra”63, this made academic studies in Zionism and the Yishuv 
(the pre-independence Jewish community in Palestine) possible.64 The passing of the 
founding generation meant that the younger generation could write the history of the 
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Yishuv freed of private memories.65 These factors, claims Kolatt, facilitated the 
establishment of a first generation of academic Yishuv historians, of which himself 
was the founder with his dissertation which was completed in 1964.66  This 
generation also included historians such as Dan Giladi, Elkane Margalit, Yosef Gorny 
and Anita Shapira. Also important where the historical oriented social scientists: 
Yonathan Shapiro, Dan Horowitz, and Moshe Lissak. These scholars usually wrote 
their dissertations under the guidance of professors on the history of the diaspora 
Jews. What characterizes this generation is that they by large were sympathetic 
critics of Labor-Zionism, and the characters that were the heroes of the Yishuv era. 
Although they today constitute the establishment of the Israeli academia and are the 
seniors of the universities, they were in the 1970s regarded and regarded themselves 
as rebels, emancipating from the dogmas of the storytellers of previous generations. 
However, in fact they were political historians and in-house critics of the Labor-
movement. And still to this day, much of the historiography, even that deserving of an 
international audience remains untranslated.67 
- Anita Shapira 
The most successful and notable of historians from this generation is Anita Shapira.  
Sometimes called “the Princess of Zionist Historiography”68, she is very much a part 
of the modern Israeli academic establishment. She is the founder of the Yitzhak 
Rabin Center for Israel Studies, a Ruben Merenfield Professor of the Study of 
Zionism and head of the Weizmann Institute for the Study of Zionism at the Tel Aviv 
University. In addition, she received the Israel Prize in 2008.69  Shapira started her 
carrier writing about the history of the Yishuv, and especially the Labor-movement of 
the 1930s. Later she focused on the history of the state of Israel, and especially the 
role of Zionism in Israeli society. Inspired by Begin’s remarks about the 1982 invasion 
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of Lebanon as “a war of choice” (which I will return to later), Shapira wrote Land and 
Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948 (1992) which as the title says also 
deals with the event of the first Arab-Israeli Conflict. In this book she says that 
originally, Zionism had a defensive ethos, but that the escalation in violence following 
the Arab revolt in the late 1930s caused a shift in the Zionist mentality and forced the 
movement over in an offensive ethos.70  However, the conclusions are still that the 
Arabs are to blame, and that there is no fault at Israel. The title of the book in Hebrew 
is quite revealing. ברח הנויה literary means “The Sword of the Dove”. Shapira claims 
that Israel was the Dove that was forced to carry a sword.  
The New Historians 
As I have already mentioned. The New Historians are not a card-holding club, but 
rather individual historians that Benny Morris would describe as part of a group of 
New Historians following his sympathies and antipathies. However, a core group has 
over the years crystalized as the definition of the New Historians. These are in 
addition to Benny Morris himself; Ilan Pappé and Avi Shlaim. These three, together 
with Simha Flapan were the founders of what can be described as paradigm-shifting 
historiography by the late 1980s. As Flapan died in 1987, he was never part of the 
group of New Historians, though his last book certainly was part of the New 
Historiography.     
Indeed, the pioneer of the New Historiography was Simha Flapan (1911-1987). He 
was first in the field with his book: The Birth of Israel: Myths and realities (Pantheon 
Books, 1987)71 It was also the most comprehensive work of the early New 
Historiography, as he listed seven notions from the Zionist narratives, labeled them 
as myths and aimed for debunking them all at once. Unfortunately, as he died the 
same year the book was published, he was not a part in the quite heated debate that 
came as a reaction to the New Historiography.71 In this book he formulates seven 
myths, to which each a chapter in his book is devoted, surrounding the birth of Israel 
and the 1948 war. These were: 1. That Zionists accepted  the U.N. partition and 
planned for peace. 2. That Arabs rejected the  partition and launched war. 3. That 
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Palestinians fled voluntarily, intending reconquest. 4. That all the Arab states united 
to expel the Jews from Palestine. 5. That the Arab invasion made war inevitable. 6. 
That defenseless Israel faced destruction by the Arab Goliath. 7. That Israel has 
always sought peace, but no Arab leader has responded.72  
In the following year of 1988, the 40-year anniversary of the establishment of the 
Jewish state of Israel, three books came out which all together laid a damper on 
celebrations. These books were The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-
1949 (Cambridge University Press, 1988) by Benny Morris, Collusion across the 
Jordan, King Abdullah, the Zionist movement and the Partition of Palestine (Columbia 
University Press, 1988) by Avi Shlaim and Britain and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-
1951 (St. Martin’s Press, 1988) by Ilan Pappé. Where Flapan’s book had (according 
to Benny Morris) severe historical flaws, these books were written with more scrutiny 
and lay founded on intensive archive research. Along with other concurrent works73 
and a large number of journal articles74, these books undermine, if not totally 
demolish the notions that Flapan formulates as myths. In doing this the new 
historiography also lays a heavy burden of guilt on Israel for its conduct in the first 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and especially the origin of the Palestinian refugee problem.75 It 
is important to notice that all these books were published in English by historians 
educated in Britain. That puts them aside from most of the preceding historiography 
of Israel, which is written in Hebrew by historians mostly educated at Israeli 
universities.  
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Benny Morris (born 1948) 
Benny Morris is a professor of history in the Middle East Studies Department of Ben-
Gurion University, Israel. He is often called the Dean of New Historiography as it was 
he who coined the term. His research on the actions of the Haganah during the 1948-
war and interviews with Palestine refugees in Lebanon led to the book: The Birth of 
the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949. It challenged the myth that the 
Palestinian refugees left on their own accord, and showed how the villagers all over 
Palestine were forcible expulsed or fled as a result of widespread violence and 
massacres. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem was a game-shifter in the 
Israeli historiography. We can even say that it established a whole new paradigm, as 
after it was published in English by Cambridge Press in 1988, it has not been 
possible for serious historians on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to say that the 
Palestinian left by free will in 1948. At least not without being aware that one were 
distorting the truth. His dispassionate and positivist use of credible sources shielded 
him from criticism and rebuttals. That does not mean he was not criticized, far from it. 
But within the academic context, his writings were accepted as credible history. Much 
of Morris later bibliography relates to the same questions with titles as: 1948 and 
after (Clarendon Press, 1990), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-49 
Revisited (Cambridge Middle East Studies, 2004) and 1948, A History of the first 
Arab-Israeli war (Yale University Press, 2009).   
Ilan Pappé (born 1954) 
Ilan Pappé is an Israeli historian and social activist, professor of history at the 
University of Exeter in the UK, and co-director of the Exeter Center for Ethno-Political 
Studies.76  Pappé is in addition to being one of the three main New Historians, 
probably most famous as the author of the book The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine 
(One world, Oxford 2006), and for advocating academic boycott of Israel.77 Pappé’s 
Britain and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-1951 (1988) which was based on his 
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doctoral dissertation was effectively overshadowed by Avi Shlaims Collusion Across 
the Jordan (1988) which related to much of the same issues. Both works relates to 
the questions of which parties were favored by British policies, as well as the nature 
of the relations between King Abdullah of Jordan and the Zionists. Pappé’s later 
books tend to be more polemic, and serve an outspoken political agenda.  
Avi Shlaim (born 1945) 
Avi Shlaim is a distinguished Israeli-British scholar, a fellow at St. Anthony’s College 
and professor of foreign relations of the University of Oxford. He was elected a fellow 
of the British Academy in 2006.78 He is the oldest of the New Historians (not counting 
Simha Flapan who passed away in 1987), and was an established historian on 
European international relations well before he embarked on rewriting the history of 
Israel with the book Collusion Across the Jordan.79 Having been born in Iraq and 
living most of his life in the UK, he is of the group of New Historians the one with the 
most distance to the politics of Israel, and though his works are controversial in 
Israel, he is widely regarded as a principled and consistent scholar which have 
steered clear of the controversies that surround the persons of Morris and Pappé. 
Shlaim has written several books on the Arab-Israeli conflict, most of which relates to 
the political relations between Israel and its neighboring states. Most notable of his 
later works is: The Iron Wall, Israel and the Arab World (W. W. Norton & Company, 
2001).      
Preliminary conclusions  
The New Historians were preceded by a very diverse historiography, where the 
mainstream pro-Zionistic narrative was the only one with any real influence in the 
Israeli society, as well as in the Western world. However, this was the history written 
by the adult participants in the conflict, and were often bordering on propaganda. The 
Palestinian narrative had resonance in the Arab world as well as in radical Marxist 
movements in the West, but would never have any real significance for the 
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mainstream Israeli perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Marxist anti-Zionistic 
Israelis was a marginalized group and one of the most important works of history by 
this cohort was written by a man convicted as a Soviet spy. The mid 1960s saw the 
emergence of a revisionist but still pro-Zionist historiography from historians such as 
Anita Shapira educated in Israeli institutions. However, they dealt mostly with the 
history of the pre-independence Yishuv communities, and tended to be sympathetic 
critics of the old Zionist establishment. Also, these histories are written in Hebrew, 
and very few books have ever been translated into English. If we can talk about 
historiographical paradigms, the revisionist Zionists-historians were by and large 
writing from within the same paradigm as the fathers of the nation who were the 
authority on the history of the war of independence (1948) and the early years of the 
Israeli nation-state.  
The New Historians were the first to criticize the actions of the Zionists during the first 
Arab-Israeli conflict in a way that received attention from both the Israeli and 
international academic institutions. The books published by the three New Historians 
in 1988 were written in English, by historians educated in prestigious British 
universities. Thus, they probably felt that they were free from the paradigms of the 
Zionist historiography. In fact, they labeled the Zionist narrative as mythical and 
aimed at debunking its myths (in which they were quite successful). These historians, 
educated in British universities, writing in English, based on sound source material 
from newly opened Israeli as well as British and American military archives, laid a 
heavy burden of guilt on Israel for its conduct in the first Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
especially the origin of the Palestinian refugee problem.  
Chapter 3: Historiographical Background. 
In this chapter I will present a short biography of the New Historians that reaches up 
to 1988, as well as a survey of the historical context from which the New 
Historiography emerged. I will return to their careers and lives in chapter 4: The 
Aftermath, where I will explore the personal repercussions experienced by the 
historians and the political and historiographical consequences of the New 
Historiography during the 1990s until recent years.  
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Biographies 
Simha Flapan 
- Was born in Tomaszow, Poland in 1911 and migrated to Palestine in 1930.80 After a 
long career as a writer, publisher, peace activist and educator, he became the 
National Director of the left Zionist MAPAM party in 1954, and the director of its Arab 
Affairs department. A position he held until 1981.81 Flapan founded and was the 
editor-in-chief of New Outlook, a Middle East monthly. He also founded and directed 
the Jewish-Arab institute, and the Israeli Peace Research Institute, as well as 
lecturing as a fellow at the Harvard University Center for International affairs, and as 
a Foreign Associate of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.82 As a 
former left-wing politician, he never assumed to being neutral in writing his most 
known book: The Birth of Israel: Myths and realities (Pantheon Books, 1987) which 
was published in the year of his death. Either way it delivered a blow at the 
conventional wisdom about the birth of Israel, and served as an inspiration for the 
New Historians in their quest to debunk myths in the years to come. His conclusions 
are still controversial, as all of the New Historiography were controversial in Israel, 
but within the New Historiography they have been repeated and verified by later 
works. In retrospect, Flapans conclusions might even be viewed as moderate 
compared to the conclusions of New Historian Ilan Pappé.   
Articles on the New Historians tend to leave out Flapan with two given reasons: 1: 
His age. Being born in 1911 he did not belong to the post-independence generation 
as the other New Historians did. 2: His background as a politician: From 1954 to 
1981 he was the National Secretary of Israel’s MAPAM party. Also, his book: The 
Birth of Israel (…) is outright polemical in its tone, which Flapan openly admits:  
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“It is the purpose of this book to debunk these myths, not as an academic exercise 
but as a contribution to a better understanding of the Palestinian problem and to a 
more constructive approach to its solution”83. 
Benny Morris refers quite critically to The Birth of Israel in his essay The New 
Historiography.84 There he states that it in addition to being a polemical book written 
from a Marxist perspective; it contains severe historical flaws, and is based on poor 
research and analysis. Thus it is “not really valuable from a historical point of view.”84 
Another New Historian, Avi Shlaim, seems to hold Flapan’s contribution in higher 
regard. In an article called The Debate About 1948, Shlaim refers to Flapan’s self-
proclaimed political agenda, but does not criticize the research that lies behind the 
book.85 As Flapan’s The Births of Israel in many ways defines the New 
Historiographical project with the formulations of myths and the attempt to debunk 
them, it would be an omission to not include Simha Flapan’s work as a part a survey 
of the New Historiography.  
Benny Morris 
Benny Morris was born in Kibbutz Ein HaHoresh in December 1948. His parents 
were Jewish immigrants from Great Britain with Marxist beliefs,86 and Morris grew up 
in a “left-wing pioneering atmosphere”.88 His father became an Israeli diplomat,87 and 
the family spent many years in New York as well as in Jerusalem. He finished his 
studies at the Jerusalem’s Hebrew University before going to Cambridge to do a 
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doctorate on European History.88 Morris served as a paratrooper in the IDF during 
the Six-Day War of 1967, and in 1982,89 he was called back in as a reservist to 
participate in Israeli invasion of Lebanon.90 At the time, Morris was working as a 
journalist for the Jerusalem Post, and he was actually doing journalistic research in 
Lebanon before donning the uniform as a soldier in a mortar unit during the assault 
on Beirut. On his way through Lebanon as a reporter, Morris visited Palestinian 
refugees at the Rashidia camp outside Tyre where he did interviews.91 The 
Palestinian refugee problem would later become the defining issue of his career as a 
historian.  
Career as a historian 
After Lebanon, Benny Morris received a lucrative offer from Palmach, an elite Jewish 
fighting force, who wanted the ambitious young historian to write their history which 
included their operations during the first Arab-Israeli conflict. Morris was given full 
access to their archives but was one month later kicked out after the veterans 
regretted giving access to their archives to a Cambridge doctorate.92 Later, one of 
Palmachs veterans and biographer of David Ben-Gurion; Shabtai Teveth, became 
one of Morris’ fiercest critics. I can only speculate, but it seems likely that Morris and 
the Palmach veterans didn’t see eye to eye on how the material should be presented. 
However, this coincided with the releasing of other Government archives under the 
30-year rule, which enabled Morris to follow his pursuit of exploding myths. Amongst 
them was the notion of Israel’s innocence in creating the Palestinian refugee problem 
the most ripe. His research led in 1988 to the publishing of the book The Birth of the 
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Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949. It was a powerful blow to the Zionist 
narrative, and revolutionized the Israeli Historiography. In this book he shows how 
Israeli forces expelled thousands of Palestinians and how massacres and other acts 
of violence such as rape and random killings created an atmosphere of fear that led 
other Palestinians to flee. This contrasted the traditional narrative, in which the 
Palestinians fled on request of Arab leaders to give way for the Arab invasion of 
1948.93 
Ilan Pappé 
Ilan Pappé was born in Haifa in 1954 to a German-Jewish family. According to 
himself, he lived his early years in “blissful ignorance about the world beyond the 
comfortable and safe mount Carmel”94. He was not aware that the city’s Arab 
population had once been much larger, and that the dwellings in which the Israelis 
inhabited on Mount Carmel, to a large extent had been confiscated from their Arab 
owners during the years of 1947-1948. In High School he was exposed to the 
realities of the Palestinians Nakba through a couple of Palestinian classmates during 
a guided school tour of the old town in Haifa city. However, it was not until later the 
historical interest emerged. In high school he learned literally Arabic, which qualified 
him to service in the intelligence corps in the Israeli Defense Force, into which he 
was drafted at 18 years of age. Ilan served as a regular soldier in the intelligence 
corps during the 1973 Yom Kippur War on the Golan Heights.95 Pappé has later 
given the following observation about Israel’s intelligence corps:  
“My three compulsory years in the army, including the 1973 war, were spent in that 
corps, and were not a bad workshop for polishing my Arabic, but quite poisonous if 
you believed what you were told about the “enemy”.95  
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After military service, Pappé went on to the Hebrew university in Jerusalem where he 
finished a bachelor degree in Middle Eastern history in 1979. He later left Israel for 
England and doctoral studies at the University of Oxford (finished in 1984)96. There 
he studied the British angle to the conflicts in the Middle East. Ilan Pappé’s Britain 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-1951 is based on the doctorate theses Pappé 
submitted.97 The main findings of the book are the British role in the partition of 
Palestine between Israel and Jordan at the expense of the Palestinians right to self-
determination.98 This book earned him a place in the group of the New Historians in 
the eyes of Benny Morris.99  
Avi Shlaim 
Avi Shlaim was born to a wealthy merchant family in Baghdad in 1945, and lived a 
privileged life there with his parents until he was five years old.100 In the aftermath of 
the establishment of Israel in 1948, most Iraqi Jews left Iraq for Israel, Avi and his 
family were amongst them. In leaving they lost their mansion in Baghdad and their 
wealth. Shlaim settled in Ramat Gan in Israel with his parents. Being a “oriental” Jew 
from Bagdad, he was made to feel inferior in his community of Jews with mostly 
European origin. At sixteen he left for the UK where he attended a Jewish school in 
London. He returned to Israel to serve national duty in the years 1964-66, just 
missing the six-day-war of 1967.101 After finishing military service, he again traveled 
to the UK and studied history at Cambridge University with the aim of serving as a 
diplomat in the Israeli Foreign Office.101 He intended to return to Israel to join the 
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Israeli Foreign Service, but was called back to a position as reader at the University 
of Reading’s department of international relations.102 He became an expert on 
European foreign relations, and wrote books on the EEC. From that position he was 
later invited as an external examiner to review the work of a young Israeli student at 
the University of Oxford. That student was Ilan Pappé. Shlaim became impressed 
with Pappés historical research:  
“Ilan is my intellectual mentor. He is younger than me, but he did all the research 
about this period, and it was pioneering work. He came up with the notion that 
Britain’s aim towards the end of the people mandate was Greater Transjordan. That 
Britain didn’t want a Palestinian state. It was resigned to a Zionist state, but it 
colluded with its current King Abdulla to grab and annex the Arab part of Palestine. 
Hence Ilan was the pioneer, and he influenced my thinking.”103 
In 1987 he was awarded with a professorship at the University of Oxford,102 and has 
since continued his scholarship from that institution. After being inspired by the 
findings in Pappé’s doctoral dissertion to examine the history of the Israeli-Jordani 
relations, he embarked on a research project which led to the publishing of the book: 
Collusion across the Jordan. King Abdullah, the Zionist movement and the partition of 
Palestine (1988). In 676 pages, Shlaim gives a complete survey of the political 
relations across the Jordan spanning the duration of contact between the Zionists 
and king Abdullah. The scope and detail in which this relationship was explored 
completely overshadowed Pappé’s account of the same relation in Britain and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict 1948-51 (1988), although their vantage point differed. While 
Pappé viewed the conflict from British lenses, Shlaim’s work was a more direct study 
of the relationship between the Zionists and Abdullah of Jordan.104   
Of the New Historians, Avi Shlaim was the one with the most classical background as 
an historian. While it must be said that Flapan had a political motivation behind his 
writings, and that Pappé and Morris was sympathetically instilled toward the 
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Palestinian cause, Shlaim is a different case. He denies having any political agenda: 
“I do have an agenda, but it’s a scholarly agenda. My agenda was to write about the 
history of this conflict as fully as I could, as accurately as I could and as interestingly 
as I could.”105 
Historiographical context 
Before going into the substance of the writings of the New Historiography, I will try to 
explore the political and historical context in which the New Historians lived and 
worked. What enabled the New Historians to part from the Zionist historiography? My 
argument is that the combination of liberal archive laws and a newer before seen 
schism in Israeli politics after the 1982 Lebanon war, were the main catalysts for 
making the writings of the New Historians feasible.  
 
 
Liberal archive laws 
Israel has compared to other countries in the region a liberal archive law, passed in 
1955 and amended in 1964 and 1981. An important feature is a 30-year rule that 
allows declassification of official documents after 30 years. This rule was adopted 
from the British and is a legacy of the British mandate. As Israel has applied this rule 
very liberally, it allowed in the early 1980-ies the opening of a great deal of 
documents from the Foreign Office, The Prime Minister’s Office as well as the 
Defense Ministry, and even the separate IDF archive with the records for 1948.106 
These waste archives dating from the first years after the Israeli independence, made 
it possible for the first time to write the history of the early years of Israeli statehood 
based on government documents and correspondence, rather than memories and 
memoirs.107 This is one of the main explanations for why the new historiography 
emerged, and all of the new historians credit the relative liberal archive policy of 
Israel for making their historical research of the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli conflict 
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possible.107 As the 30 year rule was adopted from British policies, the British archives 
of the mandate administration was also opened, and hence the new historians could 
study both sides of the conflict between Britain and the Zionists from newly opened 
archives in both countries. Ilan Pappé who did his doctoral thesis at the University of 
Oxford, based his research heavily on these archives, and published ground 
breaking findings in Britain and the Arab-Israeli conflict 1948-1951 (London, 1988). 
Unreleased material  
That being said, not all relevant documents have been released. The main bulk of still 
classified documents are intelligence materials, as those belonging to the Mossad108. 
Avi Shlaim experienced this while prying for more information on the Israeli-Jordanian 
peace attempts: 
 
“Some documents are not released at all. Any files that have intelligence material in 
them are not released. For my biography of king Hussein of Jordan, most of the 
secret talks between the king and Israel started in 1963, and they became really 
important after the 1967-war. I had hoped that documents about these meetings 
would be released. But they were not released. I asked the state archivist why they 
were not released? And he said that they contained intelligence material, and that the 
Mossad were involved as well as diplomats from the foreign ministry. And I said: Why 
won’t you dismantle the files, and take out all the Mossad documents and leave the 
foreign documents? And he said: I will check for you. So he checked and the answer 
was: No. So, not everything is released.”109 
Probably more than any of the other New Historians, Benny Morris have depended 
on intensive research in the IDF archives for his books. In 1988 he published The 
Birth of the Palestine Refugee Problem, mainly based on newly released archive 
material. However, some of the more sensitive IDF archives were not released at that 
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time, so Morris kept coming back as they released more material. Thus in 2004 he 
published a second book: The Birth of the Palestine Refugee Problem, Revisited, 
where he incorporates this new material. This signifies the importance of being ahead 
of the game, and incorporating new material as it comes out. According to Avi 
Shlaim, Benny Morris is particularly good at this. And further that Morris lives up to 
the creed of the British historian E. H. Carr, who says in his book: What is history?: 
“History is a perpetual dialogue between the historian and his sources.”110 In his 
continuant return to the archives, Morris is having this dialogue with the sources. His 
commitment to representing the historical facts as directly as possible has earned 
him the respect of his fellow historians, despite political differences. In summary it 
can be said that the whole New Historiographical project rests on the liberal policy of 
releasing government documents from the archives under the 30-year rule.  
The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.  
The other main catalyst for the development of the new historical research was 
according to the new historians themselves the Israeli occupation of South-Lebanon 
in the later stage of the ongoing Lebanese civil war.  The invasion in 1982 and 
especially Israel’s part in the Sabra and Shatila massacre perpetrated by the 
Christian Lebaneese Phalangist-militia had an earth-shattering effect on the Israeli 
public. It resulted in the first case of political dissent while the war was still 
ongoing.111 This dissent and criticism of the right-wing policies of the regime created 
a window of opportunity for both a different approach to peace within the Israeli 
public (which in turn led to the Oslo-peace agreement), as well as a reception for a 
new critical historiography.   
The Lebanese Civil War 1975 - 1990 
The ethnically and religiously diverse Lebanon had been governed based on the 
1932 census and the 1943 National Pact. However, the demography was changing, 
and by the 1970ies the Christians was no longer the majority. The Shi’ites, being the 
new majority demanded more influence, which the Christians were reluctant to grant 
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them.112 This led to the forging of the Lebanese National Movement, a front based on 
a loose coalition of discontented Muslims who advocated administrative reform, the 
abolition of religion as the basis of politics, and support for the Palestinian 
Commandos. The main destabilizing factor was still the PLO113 who in 1970 during 
Black September had been forced out of Jordan by King Hussein. PLO fled to 
Lebanon and joined the Palestine refugees mainly located in the south. From there 
they commenced the guerilla-raids into Israel and acted as a state within the state.112  
  
The provocation from the PLO, and the mobilization of the Lebanese National 
Movement, led the Christians to prepare for an armed confrontation by stocking up 
on arms and ammunitions in a large scale. This in turn caused an arms-race where 
all the different factions were arming themselves to the teeth. The Christian Phalange 
chose to hit first, killing 27 Palestinians in an attack on a bus in April 1975.114 This led 
to a round of fighting between the Christian Maronites and the PLO that lasted until 
the PLO forces accepted a cease-fire and withdrew from the fighting at the end of 
June. However, the fighting was not over between the Lebanese themselves, as the 
Muslim front clashed with the Christians Phalange in August 1975. The PLO was 
drawn back into the fighting in January 1976, while the Lebanese army started to 
disintegrate into the confessional enclaves. This spurred an all-out civil war which 
was expanded until the Syrian President Al-Asad chose to intervene on behalf of the 
Christian Maronites by May 1976. The fighting was temporarily brought to a stop and 
by October 1976, Syria and the PLO accepted a cease-fire agreement, allowing the 
PLO to again commence its operations into Israel from bases in South-Lebanon. 
Israeli invasion and UN intervention  
However, the conflict between the Lebanese continued, and the different factions 
each held military dominance over their sectarian enclaves. War became a way of 
life, and the authority of the central government did not reach beyond the capital if 
that. Israel came into the conflict first in 1978, when 25.000 Israeli troops invaded 
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Lebanon as far as the Litani-river. Their target was PLOs sphere of control in 
Lebanon which stretched from their headquarters in West-Beirut along a belt towards 
their bases in southern Lebanon. The invasion was not successful as the Israelis did 
not manage to uproot the PLO from their strongholds. It did however cause a 
massive demographic upheaval as thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese flew 
before the invading force north towards Beirut. UN-pressure led to the 
disengagement of Israeli troops and the installation of the United Nations Interim 
Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to provide a buffer between Israel and the PLO.114   
The Begin government where Ariel Sharon served as Defense Minister was not 
content with the result of their 1978 invasion, and plotted for a new intervention that 
would destroy the PLO fighting force once and for all as well as push out the Syrian 
forces that was uncomfortably close to the Israeli border. They understood that they 
needed to install a stable pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon that could suppress the 
Palestinian guerilla activity in the south. They started talking to Bashir Gemayel, the 
Christian militia leader of the Maronites who were in the process of establishing direct 
control of all the Christian militias. By 1982, Bashir and the Begin-regime were ready 
to go to action in Lebanon and the Israelis only needed a pretext for an all-out 
invasion. The pretext was provided by a series of PLO mortar and rocket attacks 
against settlements in the Galilee. Israel responded with operation Peace for Galilee, 
an invasion of southern Lebanon on June 6th, 1982.115   
Operation Peace for Galilee  
The expressed goal of the operation was to destroy PLO bases in the south of 
Lebanon, but the real objectives of the operation was to disintegrate all of the PLO 
fighting capability in Lebanon including their headquarters in West-Beirut as well as 
installing Bashir Gemayel as the new president. Objections to the invasion began to 
rise both internationally as well as in Israel when the Israeli troops within days had 
pushes as far as the outskirts of the Lebanese capital and Defense Minister Ariel 
Sharon ordered a siege of the city itself. The heavy civilian casualties from the 
intense bombardment as well as the deterioration conditions in the besieged capital 
led to international pressure to let the PLO forces evacuate. An agreement was 
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signed, and by September 1rst, a multinational force led by French and US-troops 
evacuated the remaining PLO fighting force by sea to Tunis. The agreement also 
guaranteed the security of the Palestinian civilians left in Beirut.115  
It seemed that Sharon and Begin had reached all their objectives when Bashir 
Gemayel was elected president in late August. Then two weeks later he was 
assassinated, and the scheme began to unravel. Sharon then violated the agreement 
that protected the Palestinians, and entered West Beirut. There he gave passage to 
the vengeful Maronite Phalange who entered the Palestinian dominated 
districts/refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila116 where they massacred more than 
1000 civilians that had been left unprotected by the PLO evacuation.117   
The reports of the massacre produced an international outcry as well as in the Israeli 
public. This was the first case of political dissent while the war was still ongoing.118 
Peace Now, an Israeli non-governmental peace organization founded by reserve 
officers led massive protest in Tel Aviv calling for the establishment of a national 
inquiry commission on the massacre, as well as the resignation of Defense Minister 
Ariel Sharon who oversaw the Israeli operations in the area.119  
Anti-war protests 
The protests rallied 400.000 demonstrators in Tel Aviv, which equals about 10% of 
the Israeli population at the time.120 The Kahan-commission was subsequently 
installed to look into the circumstances of the killings in the Palestinian refugee 
camps, and The Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was found to bear “personal 
responsibility (...) for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge" and "not taking 
appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed". They also concluded that the Israeli 
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forces held indirect responsibility for the massacre by facilitating the Phalangist’s 
operations first of all by admitting the Phalangists to the refugee camps in the Israeli 
occupied area, failing to take action to stop the killings after the first reports of the 
massacre came in, as well as supporting the militia by illuminating the camps with 
light-grenades fired by Israeli troops.121 As a consequence, the commission 
recommended the removal of Sharon from his position, which Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin refused to do. Sharon was however forced to resign as Defense 
Minister by the public uproar following the assassination of Peace Now activist Emil 
Grunzweig122, but remained in the Begin-administration as a Minister without 
Portfolio, and was years later elected Prime Minister of Israel. In this environment of 
a never before seen dissent and protest against the governments military operations 
during the war in Lebanon, Prime Minister Begin played (probably rather unwillingly) 
a decisive role in the opening of the “Pandoras Chest” of history revision that is 
known as the New Historiography.  
The importance of Menachem Begin and the Likud for history revision  
Menachem Begin (born 1913 in Brest- Litvosk, modern day Belarus, died in Israel 
1983), was the sixth Prime Minister of Israel, and had in 1978 received the Nobel 
Peace Prize123 together with Mohammad Anwar al-Sadat (president of Egypt 1970-
1981) for the negotiations leading up to the signing of the 1979 Egypt-Israeli Peace 
Agreement.124 However, Begin was ever a hawk125. Shortly after arriving in Palestine 
in 1943, he led the Jewish paramilitary terrorist organization Irgun who targeted 
Arabs and British alike, fighting for Jewish dominance and sovereignty over all of 
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Palestine as well as the East Bank of Jordan.126 As a Zionist Revisionist, Begin 
argued for an offensive foreign policy and had claimed that all the land on both banks 
of the river Jordan was Erez Izrael, the destined Jewish homeland.127 When coming 
to power with Likud after decades as the opposition-leader he sought to annex the 
West-Bank128 into Israel. But by doing so, he needed to suppress the Palestinian 
resistance there which he hoped to do by destroying the PLO fighting capabilities in 
Lebanon. With operation Peace for Galilee he reached that objective, but at the same 
time he alienated huge parts of the Israeli public because of the invasion and the 
atrocities in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.129 This created a never before 
seen schism in the Israeli public which was not easily mended. Up until the invasion 
of Lebanon planned by the Likud-regime, the Zionist leaders had been cultivating an 
image of being peace-loving leaders who would never enter into a conflict that was 
not forces upon them. It was a notion of no choice, that the conflicts had been 
inevitable. However, after the massive pressure from the opposition, Begin admitted 
in his famous speech to the IDF Staff Colleagues on war of choice and no choice, 
that the Lebanon war had been a war of choice. Professor Avi Shlaim gave an 
accurate assessment of this speech and its consequences that I will refer as a whole.  
“He not only admitted that the Lebanon war was a war of choice, but he claimed 
lightly that the Suez-war of 1956 was also a war of choice. It wasn’t imposed on 
Israel. And the Labor party people are hypocrites and they attacked him and said: 
“No, all previous wars were defensive wars, but this war was different. It was an 
offensive war, and you are to blame. So there was a debate. And the notion of “no 
alternative”, that Israel had its back to the wall and it had no alternative to stand up 
and fight, -that consensus collapsed. The new historiography emerged in that 
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intellectual context of argument and dispute and challenging notions about the good 
intentions and decency of the Israeli leadership”130. 
That’s not even the whole story. Begin went further and claimed that the only 
difference between himself and David Ben-Gurion, was that he (Begin) was openly 
carrying out his policies, where Ben-Gurion used deception to hide his true intentions. 
According to Begin, Ben-Gurion had been planning to divide Lebanon by setting up a 
Christian state north of the Litani-river, and Begin was merely following in his 
footsteps. He referred to Ben-Gurion’s persistence in denying the Palestinians in 
setting up an independent state, and the policies of destruction of abandoned 
Palestinian villages and wiping them completely off the map, as well as the transfer-
policy. These were all policies by Ben-Gurion in the interest of achieving a 
homogenous Jewish state.131  
Checking Begin ’s claims 
Begin’s claims to historical continuity from the Ben-Gurion era did not go unnoticed. 
At that time, no one was asking questions about the ethics of David Ben-Gurion’s 
administrations in Israel. The 1948-war was still seen as the heroic fight for survival, 
and most Israelis found Begin’s comments preposterous. After all, Ben-Gurion and 
Begin had remained enemies for the remainder of Ben-Gurion’s lifetime as they had 
been bitter adversaries in the conflict between the left and right wings of the Zionist 
movement from before the end of the mandate period. The conflict between the right 
wing revisionist movement led by Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Begin and Ben-Gurion’s 
Labor-dominated Jewish agency movement had nearly caused a civil war in the 
years before the establishing of the Jewish state. Begin’s comparison of his own 
policies in Lebanon (of which one tenth of the Israeli population had taken to the 
street in protest against) and Ben-Gurion’s policies during the 1948 War of 
Independence (which had never been subject for controversy) were mostly met with 
disbelief and headshakes.131 However, the Pandora’s box was opened, and 
historians and journalists took to examining the claims in order to either disprove or 
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confirm the claims. Some were only interested in exposing Begin’s claims as lies, 
while other had a genuine interest in examining the evidence of Ben-Gurion’s policies 
from this new perspective. As this coincided with the releasing of classified 
documents from the government offices and Ben-Gurion’s own correspondence, the 
investigators had a rich body of sources to draw from. Whatever reasons for the 
investigations, all who was checking Begin’s claims against the documents and 
available evidence had to admit that they were based on facts.  
For being a hawk, Begin appears to have been an honest hawk. He had intimate 
knowledge of the actions of Haganah during the 1947-1949 conflict, and did not 
seem to have the same need as the MAPAI old guard to resort to subterfuge. Begin’s 
Likud-party had in 1981 been instrumental in securing the release of official 
documents under the 30-year rule. They didn’t fear more openness about the war of 
1948.132 Quite the opposite, it seems that more openness about the policies under 
Ben-Gurion was what they wanted, as it exposed the hypocrisy of their critics. This 
openness relating to their own policies and the releasing of government archives, 
where crucial catalysts for the development of the historiography of the New 
Historians.   
 
 
The first Palestinian Intifada 
If it was the openness of the Likud-administration and the repercussions of the 
Lebanon-war that were the catalysts and facilitators of the New Historians, it was the 
Palestinian Intifada that propelled their fame and public interest.  
During the years after the Israeli occupation of the remaining Palestinian territories 
after the six-day-war in 1967, the level of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians 
were relatively low (with the exception of some initial fighting in 1970). After the 
expulsion of PLO from Jordan in 1970, the organizations guerilla-fighting was mainly 
limited to the border between Israel and Lebanon, as well as the scenes of 
international airports. On the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians and Israelis 
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commuted back and forth relatively freely, and thousands of Palestinians found work 
in Israel.133 This was all to change in the late 1980s. 
Intifada is Arabic for uprising/rebellion and literary means shaking off. The first 
Intifada was a popular uprising of the Palestinians in the Israeli occupied territories 
that erupted in December 1987 in Gaza, and then spread to the West Bank. The 
Intifada developed into a Palestinian national campaign of boycott on Israeli 
products, general strikes, graffiti and barricades that targeted the Israeli occupation, 
but it was the riots and stone-throwing of the Palestinian youths against well-armed 
Israeli soldiers that captured the international attention.134 The image of Palestinian 
stone throwing boys being shot by Israeli soldiers hiding behind shields and tanks 
effectively reversed the image of the Israeli David against the Arab Goliath. Now, it 
was clear who was the David of the parallel, and Israel faced a never before seen 
criticism for its policies of occupation from Western and indeed American news-
agencies. This was mainly due to the death toll on the Palestinian side which became 
shockingly high. More than thousand Palestinians were killed by the Israelis, 
compared to a relatively low number of casualties on the Israeli side (about 140 
during the years of the Intifada).135   
The intifada had ramifications for the historiography of the New Historians in several 
aspects. It coincided with the publishing of the four central books in 1987 and 1988 
as referred earlier. However the research for these books was done earlier, so the 
writing of the books cannot be attributed to the Intifada.  However, The Intifada led to 
an awakening in the international society as well as in the liberal-secular communities 
in Israel towards the issue of the plight of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
This in turn led to an unprecedented interest in the critical historiography of Israel. 
Combined with the PR-skills of Benny Morris, the New Historians reached 
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widespread fame and their influence spilled over the boundaries of academia, into 
the realms of politics.136 Benny Morris, sometimes called the Dean of the New 
Historians, was as mentioned earlier called in for reservist duty on the West Bank in 
1987 during the uprising, but refused and was jailed for three weeks. Morris was 
hence admired for his integrity and social consciousness, which only fueled the 
popularity of the New Historians especially abroad and amongst the Palestinians. 
The intifada and the pressure it created on Israel and PLO alike, was in turn one of 
the main catalyst for the Oslo-peace process which were put in motion in 1993.     
Preliminary conclusions 
It is clear that the New Historians background and upbringing have influenced their 
writings, but it is more difficult to isolate what lied behind their willingness to go into 
open conflict with the authorities of their homeland over the history of 1948. However, 
there are some similarities in their background. Simha Flapan had intimate 
knowledge of the Arab societies from decades in the Mapam Arab Affairs office. This 
insight must have been crucial in the development of The Birth of Israel, Myths and 
Realities. Likewise: Ilan Pappé learned Arabic during his military service, and Shlaim 
who also speaks Arabic, was born in Arab Iraq and thus inherited a cultural legacy 
which was probably more alike that of the Arabs, than of the European Jewish 
immigrants that dominated Israel. Although Morris is not an Arab-speaker, he had 
encounters with Palestinian refugees which must have influenced his thinking. The 
shared insight in Arab language and culture must have been important for 
understanding the plight of the Palestinians. I cannot understand how the New 
Historians could willingly provoke and be risk alienation by their homeland without 
having deep sympathies with the Palestinian people.  
The New Historians has all since the end of the 1980s been accused for promoting a 
pro-Palestinian political agenda. Morris and Shlaim categorically deny having any 
such agenda, while Flapan openly admitted that he had. Flapan was a representative 
of the Israeli left-wing, which always has promoted accommodation rather than 
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confrontation towards the Palestinians and the Arab neighbor-states. Ilan Pappé’s 
Britain and the Arab Israeli conflict, is an adaptation of his doctoral thesis and cannot 
be said to be polemical, rather the opposite: It is quite dry and formal. However, 
Pappé was at the time already involved in Marxist politics, and was probably 
influenced by many of the same political views as Flapan. Later in life he has written 
many polemical books and articles.  
We can conclude that several events and developments came into effect in a way 
that opened a window for critical history-revision. The outrage over the brutality of the 
1982 Lebanon-war led to a never before seen schism in society. This schism again 
created an audience for regime-critical history, and the opening of government 
archives in Israel as well as Great Britain and the USA made writing this narrative 
possible. Finally Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s claim of historical continuity was 
a crucial catalyst for revising the historical perception of David Ben-Gurion and his 
policies.  
 
Chapter 4: (Re)writing the History of 1948 
“A nation,” suggested Czech-American social and political scientist Karl Deutsch 
(1912-1992), “is a group of people united by a mistaken view about the past, and a 
hatred of their neighbors.”  
This quote has been used by the New Historian Avi Shlaim on several occasions to 
illustrate the problems with the “old” Zionist Historiography. In quoting such, he 
implies that the Zionist historiography mainly serves a nationalist agenda. It is full of 
myths, distorted views that needed to be corrected by real historians.137 Most of 
these myths are related to the first Arab-Israeli conflict 1947-1949, being the heroic 
War of Independence for the Israelis, while known as the great Nakba – catastrophe 
to the Palestinians. As we have seen, these myths were never really challenged 
within the Israeli community until Menachem Begin in 1982 placed his own actions in 
the Lebanon-War within the continuity of the policies of David Ben-Gurion during the 
1940s and 50s. The “newness” of the New Historians thus consists of exploring this 
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historical continuity of aggressive Israeli policies towards the Arabs of Palestine from 
an Israeli perspective, and launching fierce critique of the preceding historiography.  
The four books in question: The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities by Simha Flapan 
(1987), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949 (Cambridge, 1988) 
by Benny Morris; Collusion across the Jordan, King Abdullah and the Zionist 
movement. (Oxford, 1988) by Avi Shlaim and Britain and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
1948-1951 (London, 1988) by Ilan Pappé offered new perspectives of historical 
developments, and were at odds with the official Zionist perceptions.  
Myth busting 
Avi Shlaim has presented the myths and conclusions of new history in an article 
written several years later, which summaries the efforts of the new historians in the 
years after 1988:  
“* The official version said that Britain tried to prevent the establishment of a Jewish 
state; the "new historians" claimed that it tried to prevent the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. 
* The official version said that the Palestinians fled their homes of their own free will; 
the "new historians" said that the refugees were chased out or expelled. 
* The official version said that the balance of power was in favor of the Arabs; the 
"new historians" said that Israel had the advantage both in manpower and in arms. 
* The official version said that the Arabs had a coordinated plan to destroy Israel; the 
"new historians" said that the Arabs were divided. 
* The official version said that Arab intransigence prevented peace; the "new 
historians" said that Israel is primarily to blame for the dead end.”138  
However, when referring to myths in the Israeli historiography, the New Historians 
may or may not have specific quotes examples from the Zionist historiography to 
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refer to. Flapan in The Birth of Israel139 is careful to explain the origins of the myths, 
while some of the other New Historians to a larger degree tends to view the existence 
of historiographical myths as self-evident. However, Flapan does not prove that these 
myths exist, and some of the notion he lists might be somewhat outdated in 
retrospect, in the sense that whether or not Israelis believed in them in the late 
1980s, they might not do so today. In addition to the five notions listed by Shlaim, two 
of Simha Flapans myths relates to the respectively Jewish and Arab reactions to the 
UN-Partition Plan of 1947. That is where I will start my survey.   
Reactions to the UN Partition Plan of 1947 
The causes and nature of the first Arab-Israeli war is the subject of several myths if 
we are to believe the New Historians. Beginning with the reactions to the 1947 UN-
partition plan, Simha Flapan in The Birth of Israel, claims that two notions must be 
regarded as myths:  
The Zionists accepted the UN Partition Plan of 1947 as a real compromise 
“Myth One: Zionist acceptance of the United Nations Partition Resolution of 
November 29, 1947, was a far reaching compromise by which the Jewish community 
abandoned the concept of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and recognized 
the right of the Palestinians to their own state. Israel accepted this sacrifice because 
it anticipated the implementation of the resolution in peace and cooperation with the 
Palestinians.”140  
This myth was invoked by all of the early Israeli delegates to the United Nations, and 
was essential in the propaganda strategy of the Zionist. As an example of 
establishing this notion, Flapan shows how Moshe Sharett, Israel’s first foreign 
minister and second prime minister, would refer to the question in his speeches to the 
UN Palestine Commission. The rhetoric that never represented the Zionists real 
agenda, were adopted by the Israelis and became a notion that were widely repeated 
and believed. But as Flapan proves based on the writings of the Zionist leaders 
themselves, this notion were never true: No one in the Zionist leadership ever gave 
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up their aims for securing larger parts of the Palestinian mandate than what was 
drawn up by the UN Partition Plan of 1947.141   
Indeed, a large bulk of the Zionist movement: the right wing Revisionists, had never 
accepted the partition of the original mandate of Palestine in 1922. The eastern part: 
Transjordan, was designated to a Arab emirate (and later kingdom) for Abduallah, at 
the same time as Iraq was established as a kingdom for his brother Feisal. They kept 
the symbol of the original mandate area on their banners, and called the acceptance 
of this partition by the rest of the Zionist movement for “a betrayal of Zionism and the 
possibility of developing the country (…) a failure causing great damage.”142 
Flapan also cites David Ben-Gurions war diaries in which it is clear that the 
acceptance of the Partition Resolution was only a tactical maneuver:  
“Every school child knows that there is no such thing in history as a final arrangement 
– not with regard to regime, not with regard to borders, and not with regard to 
international agreements. History, like nature, is full of alteration and change.”143   
David Ben-Gurion, was more than anything else a pragmatist, and as it turned out an 
excellent tactician. He further shows how all parts of the Zionist movement, including 
the leading MAPAI-party accepted the Partition Resolution for tactical reasons, while 
the revisionist Zionists never accepted it in any way. Flapan thus clearly regards the 
notion that the Zionists acceptance of the Partition Plan of 1947 was a real 
compromise as mythical.144  
Arab refusal of the Partition Scheme  
                                            
141
 See David Ben-Gurion’s War Diaries, December 3. 1947, referred in Flapan, Simha. (1987): The 
Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities. New York, Pantheon.   
142
 Refered in Flapan, S. (1987): The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities. New York, Pantheon. (P. 18) 
143
 Cited in Flapan, S. (1987): The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities. New York, Pantheon. (P. 13) 
144
 Flapan, S. (1987): The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities. New York, Pantheon. (P. 52) 
51 
 
“Myth two: The Palestinian Arabs totally rejected partition and responded to the call 
of the mufti of Jerusalem to launch an all-out war on the Jewish state, forcing the 
Jews to depend on a military solution.”145 
Flapan suggests that this is not true. The Arabs in Palestine and the neighboring 
countries were far from a homogenous group, and in fact many Palestinian leaders 
though they regarded the Partition Scheme as unjust and illegitimate, wanted to 
reach a modus vivendi with the Jews through the implementation of the UN 
Resolution.146 The Arab leadership had been divided by the British between two rival 
clans of semi-feudal notables, the Husseinis and the Nashashibis. The former 
secured the office of mufti of Jerusalem, an office that had through the maneuvers of 
the late mufti accumulated authority and become a national ruler role. The 
Nashashibis were appointed majors of Jerusalem.147   
The Husseinis and Nashashibis managed to join together with other families of 
notables in the Arab Higher Committee in 1936 on the eve of the general strike that 
was to turn in to the Arab Revolt. However, the Nashashibis begun the feel the 
pressure from landowners who feared that they would lose their citrus harvests, and 
issued a formal appeal to put an end to the strike and disorders. Later, after the 
announcement of the British partition plan by the Peel commission, the mufti called 
for a continuance of the revolt while the Nashishibis withdrew. The Nashishibis were 
more moderate and wanted to negotiate with the British and the Zionists.148 
The Arab Revolt which lasted until 1939 caused severe casualties amongst the 
British, Jews and Arabs alike. It ended with the brutal crack-down on the Arab 
leadership by the British military forces supported by the Haganah. The Arab Higher 
Committee was declared illegal, and their leaders were exiled. The mufti however, 
managed to escape to Damascus.149  
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Later, in 1943 communist sentiments were on the rise in the Arab communities due to 
the Soviet success on the eastern front in Europe. Also, the Istiqlal, a nationalist 
political party that had opposed the Ottoman-backed leadership of the Husseinis and 
Nashashibis during the 1920s were on the rise. This lead to a further polarization of 
the Palestinian community, and in 1945 the Istiqlal together with the Nashishibis and 
the communists left the now Husseini dominated AHC altogether and formed a 
counter organization: The Arab Higher Front. Some of the leaders of the new 
organization advocated a joint military effort alongside the Jews to out the British.150 
This shows the level of rivalry amongst the parties and important families of the 
Arabs in Palestine.  
By 1947, the Husseinis managed to bring the Arab Higher Front in under their wings 
in the fourth Arab Higher Committee. However, this unison was based on intimidation 
and threats, and many who bowed to the Mufti was really his adversaries. However, 
the AHC and the Husseinis had the support of most, but not all Palestinians. A 
boycott of Jewish merchandise was brutally however unsuccessfully enforced, and 
trade union fronts who advocated cooperation with the Jews were assassinated.151 
When the UN Commission for Palestine presented the Partition Plan in 1947, most 
Arab parties rejected it on the base that they would not accept to be left as a minority 
within a Jewish state with no right to self-determination. But that does not mean that 
the Arab communities were united behind their mufti in his call for jihad against the 
Jews. Flapan utterly rejects this notion:  
“The political parties were deeply divided and shared no common platform. The 
masses did not exert any pressure and were unwilling to engage in a jihad. When the 
AHC asked the senior officials to take over the administration of the Arab areas from 
the British with the termination of the Mandate, there was no response. Most of them 
preferred to leave their jobs and even go abroad until the storm abated.”152 
Summing up, Flapan rejects the story of the Zionist officials that Israel accepted the 
Partition Plan as a real compromise, and that the Palestinian Arabs utterly rejected it 
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and prepared for war. The great divides within the Palestinian community, and the 
lack of leadership left the Palestinian population in a state of aphetic 
defenselessness. The general support that the AHC mobilized during the Arab Revolt 
in the 1930s were nowhere near reproduced by the end of the mandate period. There 
never was a monolithic fanatical jihad on the Jewish communities by the Palestinian 
Arabs. Flapan also points out that the Zionists had ample opportunity to cooperate 
with the moderate forces amongst the Palestinians if they really wanted the partition 
plan implemented. Instead, the ideology of expansionism prevailed, and the scheme 
of securing most Palestine for a Jewish state became a success, however at a costly 
price for Palestinians and Jews alike.153  
British policies 
The first myth was never amongst those listed by Flapan in The Birth of Israel, but 
has been formulated by Avi Shlaim as the question of British policies has been 
central in the historiography of himself and Ilan Pappé. The myth can be formulated 
as such: Great Britain’s policies throughout the mandate period were aimed at 
preventing the establishment of a Jewish state.154 According to Shlaim, this was not 
so. Rather the British policies served to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian 
state through its collaboration with the regime of King Abdullah of Jordan:  
“A subsidiary thesis is that, by secretly endorsing Abdullah’s plan to enlarge his 
kingdom, Britain became an accomplice in the Hashemite-Zionist collusion to 
frustrate the United Nations partition resolution of 29 November 1947 and to prevent 
the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state.”155  
The Peel Commission 
Shlaim explains that it was the Arab revolt in 1936 – 39 that was the catalyst for the 
development of British policies leading to partition of Palestine. In an effort to 
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examine the causes of the revolt and what was needed to solve the situation, a Royal 
Commission was established, headed by Earl Peel. The Commission traveled to 
Palestine to receive the grievances of all parties. King Abdullah of Jordan exerted his 
influence over the Arabs of Palestine to stop the revolt and meet with the 
Commission. The reasons for the revolt were the ever increasing Jewish immigration 
and the question of land purchase. The Jews were reluctant to proclaim their 
intentions, but the Arabs feared that the Jews were aiming for independence for a 
Jewish state in Palestine.156  
During the investigation, the members of the Commission began to think that the only 
viable solution to the fundamental conflicts between Jews and Arabs was to partition 
the land. This notion was indirectly nurtured by the Zionist leaders who had come to 
realize that the establishment of a Jewish state, even a small one, would be of 
immense significance, and only be the beginning of the Jewish national legacy. Other 
solutions such as federalism or a canton system were discarded. King Abdullah, who 
travelled to Palestine to meet with the Commission, gave the impression that though 
he outspokenly never could endorse partition, he would be happy to expand his 
kingdom into the areas of western Palestine allocated to the Arab partition. Members 
of the Commission were impressed with Abdullah after meeting him, and preferred 
Hashemite leadership along with the Nashashibi National Defense Party over the 
leadership of the Husseini mufti of Jerusalem.157  
Thus, the Peel Commission landed on partition, but with the undisclosed pretext of 
Hashemite takeover of the Arab partition at the expense of an independent 
Palestinian state. This becomes clear as King Abdullah on the occasion of King 
George coronation festival had prepared a gift of a golden dagger to King George 
where the inscription had underwent some interesting changes. First it was ordered 
from the Jeweler to say: From the Emir of Transjordan, but later it was changed to 
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the Ruler of Transjordan lands.  Clearly he had been consulted by the British about 
the real plans for partition.158   
Shlaim thoroughly shows how Britain despite Bevin’s critique of the Zionists and the 
White Paper, did not really try to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state. In fact, 
through the Peel Commission Partition Plan, they endorsed the establishment of a 
Jewish state. However, Bevin’s reputation as an anti-Semite and the images of 
Jewish refugee ships being turned away from the shores of Palestine were exploited 
in the propaganda efforts of the Zionists. The image of British hostility towards the 
Jewish nation festered, and prevailed in Israeli mentality throughout the decades. 
Even today it prevails, despite the existence of the historiography of the New 
Historians.  
 
Pappé on British Policies   
As I have already explained, Ilan Pappé’s doctoral dissertation was the inspiration for 
Shlaim’s interest in the Zionist-Hashemite relations before, during and after the first 
Arab-Israeli conflict. However, Pappé did not edit his dissertation into a book-
publication until 1988, the same year as Shlaim had finished his Collusion Across the 
Jordan. The book published by St. Martins’ Press, New York, is a typical adaptation 
of a doctoral thesis in that it is detailed, theoretical and not a very easy read. Its main 
themes are that Britain’s policies in the Middle East were a function of two main 
features:  Its close alliance with the Hashemite dynasty of Transjordan, and its 
otherwise pragmatic adaptability to developments in the area. A necessary 
adaptability one might say, faced with a rapidly changing situation on the ground and 
no clear strategy or indeed leadership from the foreign office.159 Ilan Pappé himself 
claims that he in this book was debunking one of Israel’s foundational myths: that in 
1948 Britain was the enemy of Zionism and Israel. Pappé discards this notion and 
goes further in showing how Britain played a major role in allowing the Zionist 
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movement to found a state in Palestine through the ethnic cleansing of 
Palestinians.160 
Pappé’s project was a research of (at that date) recently opened British archive 
material, in addition to Israeli and American archives, regarding British policies during 
the end of the mandate. The first part of the book is a survey of the Foreign Offices 
policies towards the Middle East, or rather the lack of a consistent policy. Pappé 
claims the nature of the rapid changes in the Middle Eastern region, forced the British 
officials to adapt to every changing circumstance and to accept every fait accompli 
whether or not they were anti-British in effect, thereby forcing them to change their 
policies to the shifting circumstances. This led to a development of a pragmatic, if not 
opportunistic foreign policy, rather than one led by a consistent strategy. In this 
environment, the different inclinations and mindset of the policymakers were 
important to understand, as the individual’s room to maneuver was wider within this 
ad hoc policy.161  
The Palestinian refugee problem 
The most controversial myth that the New Historians have dealt with, relates to the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem. In a massive propaganda effort after the war of 
independence, the Israelis tried to convince whoever would listen that the Palestinian 
fled on their own accord, meaning that they were not chased or expelled by the Jews. 
It became so important to maintain the Israeli self-image of a peace-loving nation of 
refugees that schoolbooks were written with no reference to the transfer of 
Palestinians from the area that became the state of Israel. Over the years, the new 
generations of Israelis were raised without being aware of the Arab legacy of the land 
they were living in, as was the case for the New Historian Ilan Pappé.162 Not only 
were they saying that the Arabs had left voluntarily, but they even denied that the 
Arabs had been there in the first place. History fraud was committed on a large scale 
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with the total destruction of Arab villages, and even erasing their names from the 
map.163  
This was to change in the late 1980s and 1990s. By the mid-1990s, schoolbooks 
were rewritten in order to give the children an understanding of the plight of the 
Palestinians who were made to leave during the Nakba.164 Benny Morris’ The Birth of 
the Palestinian Refugee Problem was immensely important in that matter. Never 
before had there been written a comprehensive account of the forced expulsions, 
massacres and destructions of Arab villages during the first Arab-Israeli conflict.  
However, Simha Flapan had a year earlier attempted to debunk the same myth:  
“Myth three: The Flight of the Palestinians from the country, both before and after the 
establishment of the state of Israel, came in response to a call by the Arab leadership 
to leave temporarily, in order to return with the victorious Arab armies. They fled 
despite the efforts of the Jewish leadership to persuade them to stay.”165 
Flapan rejects these notions totally. There was no call from the AHC ushering the 
Arab population to flee to give way for the Arab invading armies. In fact, the AHC 
attempted the best they could to make the Arabs stay and fight. Leaving homes to 
give way for invading Arab armies makes no sense at all. The Arab armies were 
poorly trained and had logistical difficulties. They needed the support of the local 
Arabs and their homes for shelter, food, information and fuel. Flapan supports these 
arguments by referring to the newly opened military and state archives, the same 
ones that Benny Morris were going through in the same period. 166 However, much of 
what Morris bases his later bibliography on, and indeed the revised version of his first 
book: The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited were based on archive 
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material that was not yet released by the time Flapan’s The Birth of Israel: Myths and 
Realities was published.167  
The notion of an Arab order from above served the Israelis propaganda effort in the 
years to come. Giving the impression of such an order, Flapan attributes to the 
strategic thinking of the Zionists leadership. They often transcribed portions of 
speeches from AHC representatives but distorted the meanings of the citations so 
that it would seem that the Arab leaders pleaded for the Palestinians to flee. Quite 
the opposite: There are many examples of Arab leaders issuing orders to stop the 
general flight and to convince the men of fighting age to stay and fight. In addition: 
neighboring countries in some cases took in fleeing women and children, but turned 
away men of fighting age.  Arab radio broadcasts in Ramallah and Jerusalem 
broadcasted orders from the AHC to stop the mass flight from Jerusalem and its 
vicinities.168  
Flapan also refers to plan dalet, (Hebrew letter D), which was the military operation 
plan for the securing of all areas designated to a Jewish state by the UN Partition 
Resolution. Its notoriety comes from the orders of expelling all Arab citizens in 
villages and towns that resisted military takeover by the Haganah, as well as 
destroying all Arab villages within proximity to Haganah installations in order to 
prevent their use by Arab irregulars as base of operations against the Jewish forces. 
The inhabitants of these villages were to be expelled to points outside the borders of 
the state.169 Most of the Palestinian villages on the coastal plain, as well as along the 
Tel Aviv/Jaffa – Jerusalem corridor were to be destroyed in accordance with this 
plan.  
Benny Morris and the Refugee Problem 
 Benny Morris’ The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem was published in 1988, 
and is the subject of this book. However, the book was revised in 2004, and 
republished under the name: The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. 
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The records of the expulsions of the villages remain mostly unchanged, and it is the 
revised version I will refer from. The original work is a comprehensive study of the 
operations of the Haganah and their part in the flight of the Palestinian refugees. 
Morris broke totally new ground as he uncovered atrocities on a large scale, including 
shelling of civilian villages, acts of massacre, rape and forced expulsions.170 The 
scope of the The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem is so wide, that I will have 
to give just an example of the episodes that Morris describes in detail. The operation 
in question is important as it was a turning point in the strategies of forced 
expulsions, and therefore significant in the later debate about ethnic cleansing in 
Palestine.   
Operation Nahshon 
In the part of The Birth in question, Morris gives a survey of the operations by the 
Haganah and Irgun militia in the Tel Aviv/Jaffa – Jerusalem corridor. By March 1948, 
the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem were under siege, and the supply route along 
the Jaffa-road was cut off due to attacks from Arab militiamen. The 100.000 Jewish 
residents of Jerusalem were in dire need of food and fuel, and the Jewish command 
decided that the Haganah’s first priority would be to secure the road to Jerusalem. In 
doing so, the Haganah changed strategy from defensively policing convoys, to 
offensively conquering and holding the territories along the route.171  
The orders given for the operation Nahshon were to treat all the villages along the 
route as enemy assembly or jump-off bases for the attacks on the convoys. The 
specifics of the existing plan dalet which had precedence in this operation, was that 
all villages that was offering resistance was to be destroyed, and their inhabitants 
expelled. However, villages that were not resisting were to be left intact. These 
provisions would not be followed in the course of the operation, and the 
consequences for the Arab villages were to be severe. In the case of British 
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intervention the forces of the Haganah should use delaying tactics, but ultimately – 
the orders were to be seen through.172  
Operation Nahshon came in effect with the unopposed conquest of al Qastal in the 
beginning of April. The village had been involved in hostilities along the road, and 
was attacked by a battalion from Palmach, the elite division of the Haganah. Almost 
all of the villagers fled in fear from the approaching Jewish units. In accordance to 
plan dalet, the village was not to be destroyed as it had not offered resistance. The 
commander at the site protested against the order, as blowing up the houses would 
deny it to the Arabs as a base of operations for new attacks against the convoys. 
Leaving it intact would make defense of the place difficult. However, the buildings 
were left intact, and indeed the village was a week later retaken by Arab irregulars. 
The “mistake” of not razing the buildings was rectified the next day, following re-
conquest by Palmach-forces. All buildings not needed for defense were blown up. 173  
The lesson learned was to have consequences for the other Arab villages along the 
route. In Qaluniya; the next village that was taken, 44 houses were demolished by 
explosives. By the 10th of April, the vagueness of the operation-orders was removed. 
Haganah headquarters now called for the liquidation of villages. Terminology such as 
cleansing operations was also employed. The battalions were given specific orders to 
attack and destroy villages, and to expel their inhabitants. Such specific orders were 
given for the villages of al Qubeib, Aqir, Biddu, Beit Surik, Beit Iksa, Beit Mahsir, 
Suba, Ramle, Beit Jiz, Sejad, Saris and Khulda.174  
The plan dalet’s provisions of leaving intact villages that were not offering resistance 
were now in effect replaced by the orders of permanently cleansing the area along 
the Tel Aviv-Jaffa corridor for Arab presence. Morris explains this as necessity of war, 
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the lesson learned from al Qastal that abandoned and intact villages would soon be 
retaken and used as hostile bases of operation.175 However, the combination of the 
operation-orders to treat all villages along the route as enemy assembly or jump-off 
bases, combined with the intentions in plan dalet to destroy all villages that offered 
resistance can be interpreted in other ways as well. One of main points of critique 
against Morris, is that he fails to acknowledge the existence of a pre-planned 
intention to cleanse the land designated for the Jewish state for its Arab presence. 
The idea that the combination of the orders in plan dalet and the specific instruction 
to treat all villages as enemy bases, in fact meant that the operation Nahshon from 
the beginning was planned as a cleansing operation, is not far-fetched. The effect of 
the operation is known. The Arab villagers in the Tel-Aviv/Jaffa – Jerusalem corridor 
were chased out, and their homes destroyed.176  
 
Ilan Pappé and the British angle    
Ilan Pappé is well known for addressing the Palestine refugee problem in several 
books, most notably in The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (One World, 2006). 
However, the book in question in this overview of the early historiography of the New 
Historians; Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-51 (St. Martin’s Press, 1988) is 
all about Britain’s role in the conflict.  
Pappé has dedicated a whole chapter of his book to this question. Namely: British 
Policy towards the Refugee Problem. In this chapter he offers two main approaches 
to understanding this policy. The first is what he calls the Palestine Syndrome. By 
syndrome he means the inclination of British officials to try to avoid being entangled 
in the conflicts regarding the refugee problem. By the end of the mandate, the British 
administration of Palestine had become a costly affair, both in terms of human and 
economic losses. Their efforts of retaining neutrality in the conflict between Jews and 
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Arabs ended in the alienation of both groups. The British did not want any more 
responsibility for the former mandate and its refugees. However, as the refugee 
problem very much became a problem for the British’ protégé across the Jordan: The 
Hashemite King Abdullah, Britain had to maintain some involvement in order to 
maintain their interest in Jordan and in the Middle East as a whole. These two 
conflicting inclinations were to influence British policies towards the refugee problem 
in the years to come.177  
While the British shunned direct involvement in the discussion of resolving the 
refugee problem, the new emerging superpower: USA and its diplomats were eager 
to enter the scene. Having no real experience in dealing with the region, they 
developed a plan to solve the refugee problem with economic incentives. Robert 
McGhee, the State Department’s refugee advisor, developed a scheme for a 
Marshall plan for the Middle East. Economic development and reaching a higher 
standard of life should become the bulwark against communist influence and 
infiltration. However, providing an economic solution to a political problem would not 
suffice, and Pappé attributes much of the following plight of the Palestinians to this 
mistake.178  
The Palestinian refugee problem was by the British viewed as one of several refugee 
problems that followed in the wake of the Second World War. The scope of the 
refugee problem following the Korean War not much later overshadowed the 
Palestinian problem. The attitude towards the responsibility for creating the problem 
was expressed by Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary who blamed the 
refugee problem on the Jews. In 1950, The Foreign Office attributed the mass 
exodus of the Palestinians to the not unnatural belief that they would be exterminated 
if they were to stay in their villages. But they also blamed the AHC (Arab Higher 
Committee) for encouraging the exodus. Finally, being the pragmatist that they were, 
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the British accepted responsibility themselves for being part in causing the 
problem.179  
In conclusion: Britain and the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1948-51 was not primarily 
intended as an attack on the myth regarding the origin of the Palestinian Refugee 
Problem. But in surveying the British policies and British notions about the Jew’s 
responsibility for expelling the refugees, it is clear that this book nuances the picture. 
Together, it can be said that the works of the New Historians totally demolishes the 
myth referred by Flapan.  
The balance of power 
The myth that the Jewish victory in the first Arab-Israeli conflict was as David’s fight 
against Goliath were to become a widely spread and popular myth in the Israeli 
historiography. The notion of numerically inferiority was to be exaggerated to the 
point that especially pro-Israeli Christians around the world were to become 
convinced that the Jewish victory was an intervention by God, and the establishment 
of the nation of Israel in the Holy Land a fulfillment of the ancient-old prophecies in 
the Old Testament. The victory against all odds was to be seen as the proof that the 
establishment of the Jewish state was the will of God by both by Christians and Jews 
alike.   
The question of the balance of power was never amongst the main thesis in the early 
books of the New Historians Morris, Pappé and Shlaim. Rather the debunking of this 
myth came as byproduct of the New Historians project. However, Simha Flapan 
dedicated a chapter to the debunking of this very popular notion:  
“Myth six: The tiny, newborn state of Israel faced the onslaught of the Arab armies as 
David faced Goliath: a numerically inferior, poorly armed people in danger of being 
overrun by a military Giant.”180  
                                            
179
 Pappé, I. (1998): Britain and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-51. St. Martin’s Press, New York. (P. 
127). 
180
 Flapan, S. (1987):  The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities., New York, Pantheon Books.(P. 10) 
64 
 
In most wars, the outcome of hostilities can be predicted based on several key 
factors. Among these are number of armed troops, the numbers of machine guns and 
heavy machine guns as well as mortars and other field guns, the number of tanks, 
aircrafts and armored vehicles. Also important are the level of training for the soldiers 
and their officers, the moral of the troops and the strategies of their commanders. 
Flapan argues that with the exception of the first few weeks after the announcement 
of independence, Israel had the advantage in all these key factors, and that all 
through the conflict; the forces of Israel were never outnumbered by invading Arab 
forces. He also argues that the outcome was never a miracle, but was predicted by 
the Zionist leaders, as well as British observers.181  
However, it is not a myth that the victory in the War of Independence came at a price. 
More than 6000 Israeli soldiers and civilians died in the conflict, equaling almost 1 % 
of the total Jewish population in Palestine. It is also true that in the first weeks after 
the declaration of Independence in May 1948, Israeli forces was on the defensive 
and had their hands full defending the Jewish settlements. In the initial phase, 
Haganah/IDF lacked sufficient arms, having only rifles for approximately 40 % of the 
mobilized fighting force. What the myths often fails to mention, is that Israel had 
already purchased vast amounts of weapons and only awaited their delivery. By the 
end of May, these weapons were arriving in the ports and on the airfields of Israel. 
One single airlift from Czechoslovakia on the 20th of May carried 10,000 rifles and 
more than 3000 machineguns along with other kinds of arms and ammunition. With 
this delivery alone, the IDF could muster between 25,000 and 30,000 armed men in 
the defense of the nation. If you were to count all armed personnel of the Kibbutz-
defenses and the members of the Irgun and Stern-gang, the numbers would be even 
higher. By mid-June the IDF numbered 41,000 and were still mobilizing. By 
December 1948, the number of Israeli troops reached its peak at 96,441 men and 
women at arms. The invading Arabs on the other hand, probably never counted more 
than 24.000 fighting men, including the Arabs of Palestine taking part in the 
fighting.182     
                                            
181
 Flapan, S. (1987):  The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities, New York, Pantheon Books.(P. 190) 
182
 Flapan, S. (1987):  The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities, New York, Pantheon Books.(P. 196) 
65 
 
Flapan also put emphasis on that the main bulk of Jewish casualties did not come as 
a part of the defensive war against the invading Arab armies, but rather in the 
operations following Israel gaining the upper hand as a result of arms-shipment from 
Europe. From that point on, the Jews were on the offensive and were actively 
attacking Arab villages.  
“More Israeli soldiers died while attacking than defending against attacks from 
Palestinians and Arab armies – 2409 as opposed to 1947. The number of Israelis 
killed outside the borders of the state designated by the UN was 1581; the number 
killed in the areas outside these borders was 2759.”183  
Flapan claimed that it was a myth that the Israelis died while defending their homes 
and territories. The numbers shows how the larger bulk of casualties came from 
offensive operations where the Israelis were fighting Arabs defending their homes. 
This perspective was a new and controversial one.184  
Ilan Pappé and British premonitions  
As I mentioned earlier, British observers understood before the outbreak of the Arab-
Israeli war in May 1948 that the Israelis was in a good position to counter the attack 
of the invading Armies. Ilan Pappé writes in his book: Britain and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict 1948-51 that although the Chiefs of Staffs Committee for the British forces in 
the Middle East had failed to predict the Jews success in the inter-communal war for 
the mixed towns of Jaffa, Haifa, Tiberias and Sefa, they could quite precisely predict 
the outcome of the war between the Jewish forces and invading Arab armies. This 
was due to the information given them by Glubb Pasha, the British commander of the 
Jordan Arab Legion. In May 1948 both the Chief of Staffs and the Eastern 
Department of the Foreign Office recognized Jewish military superiority in Palestine, 
and expected the Jews to only get stronger and better equipped over time. The main 
advantage of the newborn Jewish state according to the British observers was the 
establishing of an embryo state prior to the end of the mandate. This brought the 
Jews in a favorable position as it enabled them to establish central control over the 
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Jewish community, compulsory military service, and a ban on foreign travel. The 
Palestinians were in the opposite position. No strong central government, only 
voluntary and mostly rag-tag fighting forces, and most importantly – a population 
were many of the leaders and notables had the opportunity to flee, and indeed did 
flee by the thousands at the first start of fighting. 185   
In conclusion: Flapan and Pappé shows how the Jewish victory in the first Arab-
Israeli war in 1948-1949 was not the result of divine intervention, nor a David’s fight 
against Goliath. Rather, the victory was a predictable outcome when considering the 
number of forces deployed by each side, and not least: most of Israeli casualties 
came as a result of offensive operations outside the areas designated to the Israeli 
state by the UN.      
Arab unity 
The notion of unison between the Arab leaders in their fanatical quest of throwing the 
Jews on the sea is also a popular and widespread one. The debunking of this myth is 
one of the main themes of Pappé and Shlaim’s historiography. Flapan is also 
concerned with the notion:  
“Myth four: All of the Arab states, unified in their determination to destroy the 
newborn Jewish state, joined together on May 15, 1948, to invade Palestine and 
expel its Jewish inhabitants.”186   
Flapan’s version  
To continue with Flapan who states that, this myth in contradiction to some of the 
other, has been kept alive; not only by Jewish propagandist, but also the Arabs 
themselves. This has prolonged its survival, defying the overwhelming body of 
evidence that contradicts the notion. Flapan claims that the pompous rhetoric 
surrounding the Arab nation’s part-taking in the 1948 war, was mostly a cover for 
their lacking abilities to coordinate common action. The Syrian-Egypt axis opposed 
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the Hashemites of Jordan an Iraq, and the distrust was mutual. The mufti of 
Jerusalem wanted only volunteers, and was opposed to any regular army entering 
Palestine. Despite the distrust, of course all the Arab regimes opposed a Jewish 
state, and further Jewish immigration.187  
Flapan shows how the Arab nations at the time was fragile and conflict ridden. Egypt, 
struggling with poverty and underdevelopment and an unpopular King. Syria, taking 
its first steps towards independence, ridden by sectarian conflicts and coups d`état’s 
and fearing King Abdulla’s ambitions of ruling Greater Syria. Lebanon, dominated by 
its Christian minority who were interested in seeing the creation of another non-
Muslim state in the Middle East. Iraq: troubled by riots and unrest following the 
Hashemite King’s signing of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty restoring economic and military 
privileges to Britain. Saudi Arabia: having to withhold its mostly camel riding troops 
for the securing of the southern borders, fearing the spread of unrest in Yemen. 
Lastly Jordan, home to the best Arab fighting force: The Arab Legion, whose ruler 
Abdullah had engaged in secret talks with the Zionist over partitioning Palestine 
between himself and the Jews, and which military commanders where British, having 
orders to avoid direct confrontation with the Jews.188 None were prepared to engage 
in an all-out-war with the Yishuv. Only the rhetoric matched their vicious reputation 
attributed to them in the Zionist narrative.      
Shlaim’s collusion   
The main theme in Avi Shlaim’s Collusion across the Jordan (1988), is the lack of 
unison between the Arab leaders, and especially regarding the Hashemite ruler of 
Jordan; Abdullah. In Shlaim’s own words:  
“This book tells the story of the unusual and highly secret relationship between 
Abdullah, The Hashemite ruler of Jordan, and the Zionist movement. Spanning three 
eventful decades, from the appointment of Abdullah as emir in Transjordan in 1921 to 
his assassination in 1951, it focuses in particular on the clandestine diplomacy that 
led to the partition of Palestine between the two sides and left the Palestine Arabs 
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without a homeland. The central thesis is that in 1947 an explicit agreement was 
reached between the Hashemites and the Zionists on the carving up of Palestine 
following the termination of the British mandate, and that this agreement laid the 
foundation for mutual restraint during 1948 and for the continuing collaboration in the 
aftermath of the war.”189  
Shlaim shows how fragmented the Arab regimes were in explaining the nature of 
Abdullah of Jordan’s agreements with the Zionists prior to the 1948 war. There never 
was a monolithic Arab bloc, united in common hostility and fanatical determination to 
wipe Israel of the map. Rather, the Arab leaders were always divided in the strategy 
for dealing with the Zionists, and indeed one of them: King Abdulla preferred 
accommodation instead of confrontation. It was the role of the mufti of Jerusalem as 
a common enemy that united the Zionist and the Abdullah. 190 The latter had 
aspirations for widening his kingdom, and the mufti’s nationalist movement was in the 
way. For the Zionist, the mufti who had collaborated with Hitler during the Second 
World War had become the arch-enemy. This also contributed to the failure of the 
Palestinian option in the aftermath of the war.191  
Shlaim claims that the notion of Arab unity is a casualty of his studies. This notion, so 
dear to all Arab nationalists, is simply not comprehendible according to the British-
Jewish scholar. Shlaim’s book is a case study in inter-Arab conflict, rivalry and 
intrigue. Rather than being able to coordinate common strategy towards dealing with 
the Zionist-challenge, the Arab nations have hidden self-serving national policies 
behind a guise of aggressive rhetoric. As an example, Abduallah’s positioning prior to 
the hostilities in 1948 was at odds with the pan-Arabic ambitions, serving only his 
own narrow agendas at the cost of Palestinian nationhood.192  
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Ilan Pappé’s work on the British relations towards the Arab-Israeli conflict preceded 
the Collusion across the Jordan by Avi Shlaim, and was overshadowed by Shlaim’s 
work in both detail and scope on the issue of Arab unity. I will therefore not cite 
Pappé in regard to this question. However, I have previously showed how Shlaim 
gives credit to Pappé for doing the pioneering work on this issue. In conclusion: The 
message of the New Historians is that the notion of a monolithic Arab world rising in 
unison to war in a coordinated effort to destroy the Jewish state and throw the Jews 
to the sea must be abandoned. Rather, the Arabs were ridden by internal problems 
and conflicts, they were distrustful of each other and their military efforts were 
uncoordinated and half-hearted at best. Most notable: One of the Arab leaders, King 
Abdullah of the Jordan, colluded with the Zionist to constrain their forces and partition 
the mandate of Palestine between themselves.   
Futile peace attempts 
Israel’s present relations to its Arabs neighbors are still troubled. Lebanon and Israel 
are still officially at war, the cease-fire agreement stemming from 2006. Even today, 
almost 30-years after the Yom-Kippur, Israel has not yet secured a peace-agreement 
with its neighbor Syria and is still occupying the Golan Heights, captured from Syria 
in the six-day-war in 1967. In addition, no agreement with the Palestinians over the 
occupied territories of the West-Bank and Gaza has been finalized. Egypt however 
managed to secure peace with Israel in 1978-79, while the Israel-Jordan peace treaty 
was signed as late as 1994.   
Israeli spokespersons have all since 1948 tried to place the blame for the lack of 
peace-treaties on Arab intransigence. This rhetoric developed into myth as the 
message over the years was repeated. Simha Flapan formulated this myth in The 
Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities (1987):  
“Myth Seven: Israel’s hand has always been extended in peace, but since no Arab 
leaders have ever recognized Israel’s right to exist, there has never been anyone to 
talk to.”193  
Flapan continues:  
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“On the contrary, from the end of World War II to 1952, Israel turned down 
successive proposals made by Arab states and by neutral mediators that might have 
brought about an accommodation.”194 
Avi Shlaim has in The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World also decisively stated that 
this notion is groundless. Over the 573 pages of the book, he has surveyed the 
history of the Israelis contacts with its Arab neighbors. Based on archive research he 
has concluded that the Arabs have repeatedly outstretched a hand to peace, and 
Israel has always rejected it.195 Different excuses have been presented, but the real 
reasons have always been an unwillingness to accept territorial compromise.  
However, The Iron Wall (…) has not been a subject of this thesis. The Collusion 
across the Jordan (…) on the other hand is. This book has a more narrow scope, and 
explores the nature of the relations between Israel and Jordan. It has a whole 
chapter dedicated to the questions of futile peace attempts, named: The Elusive 
Peace Treaty. First and foremost, it is important to note that there have been many 
rounds of direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan, as some people still believe 
that Israel only met uncompromising hostility in the wake of the 1948 war. These 
direct negotiations got under way in November 1951, but were unsuccessful.196 
Secondly, Shlaim explains the pros and cons of a peace settlement seen from both 
Israeli and Jordanian eyes. Both countries had suffered the economic consequences 
of the 1948-war, and needed peace for economic development. Jordan had lost its 
access to the shipping port of Haifa, and the alternatives of using either Beirut or 
Akaba were disadvantageous.  Israel also faced economic challenges. The cost of a 
large standing army was a heavy toll on Israeli finances, as well as the ever 
increasing immigrants needed housing and employment. Israel would profit from 
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having access to the markets of both banks of the Jordan for commercializing its 
produce.197 
King Abdullah, ever a pragmatist also considered a peace-treaty as a potential 
forerunner to a future alliance with Israel who had become the greatest military power 
of the Middle East. This might have solidified his position as sovereign ruler of Jordan 
and even promoted his dreams of ruling Greater Syria as he then would have much 
more room to maneuver vis-à-vis the regimes of Syria and Egypt. For Israel, a peace-
treaty would be strategic as it would allow demobilization along a long and unnatural 
border and the reduction of its disproportionate large armed forces.198  
However, there were conflicting interests as well: Israel was reluctant to accept 
Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, as they saw it as the return of British interests 
to Palestine.  In addition, while Abdullah was a pragmatist and realist, he faced a 
strong internal opposition to his quest of normalizing relations to the Zionist state. 
This meant that he approached to issue of peace-negotiation with Israel with caution 
and ambiguity.199 
Shlaim writes that by the end of 1949, the Israelis were eager to reach an agreement 
by the annual meeting of UN General Assembly. The problem was the vast scope of 
issues that needed to be considered, and the concessions required from Israel.  
“The Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett estimated at the outset that they could 
reach a separate agreement with Jordan if they were prepared to make substantial 
concessions.”200  
However: 
“The Israeli government’s latitude for making concessions was restricted by various 
domestic considerations. It was known that the government was reluctant to extend 
official recognition to the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan and that it did not 
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want to go down in history as the body that officially waived the claim to any part of 
the Land of Israel. There was also opposition from the left-wing parties, Mapam and 
the Communists, to negotiations with Jordan because they regarded King Abdullah 
as a British puppet, and from the internationalist Herut party, which claimed Israeli 
sovereignty over all of Palestine.”201  
The negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful. Nevertheless, Abdullah went ahead 
with his scheme of annexing the West Bank, and suppressed the Palestinian national 
movement. This led to his assassination by the hands of Palestinian nationalists 
under a visit to Jerusalem in 1951.202 This ended the attempts of accommodation 
between the countries. A final peace treaty between the two counties was not 
finalized until 1994.  
Common threads throughout the New Historiography 
In addition to the debunking of myths, another common thread in the New 
Historiography is the critique of David Ben-Gurion. Previous historiography has 
portrayed the first prime minister of Israel as a representative of the consensus 
among the civilian and military elites, while the New Historians says that David Ben-
Gurion rather than representing a consensus was the driving force behind Israel’s 
policies in 1948. In particular: the policy of expelling the Palestinians.203  
The Methodology of the New Historians, and ideological debate 
A revisionist project?  
The term New Historians stuck in part as a refusal of the New Historians themselves 
to being labeled as revisionist historians, as was a common description by their 
critics. The term revisionist had some bad connotations, especially in an 
Israeli/Jewish setting, as it was more commonly connected to the right-wing 
Revisionist Movement in Zionism. Also in western historiography, revisionism has 
been connected to attempts to question the causes for the Second World War, and 
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indeed Holocaust denial.204 Also, in order to write revisionist history, Morris states, 
there must be an existing historiography to revise:  
“(...) but this is not really the case. Israel’s old historians, by and large, were not really 
historians and did not produce real history. In reality, they were chroniclers (...) They 
worked from interviews and memoirs, and often from memories. They had neither the 
mind-set nor the materials to write real history. To call the new history “revisionist” 
would, by implication, ascribe too much merit to the old history.”205  
Professor Yehoshua Porath of the Hewbrew University seemingly agreed, but rather 
than contrasting Old Historiography to New Historiography, he suggested that it 
would be more accurate (and perhaps slightly less offensive) to describe the 
historiography of Morris, Shlaim and Pappé as plain History opposed to the Pre-
History writing of the Zionist historiography from the preceding decades.206 Though 
Morris didn’t oppose this suggestion, it probably came too late as the term “New 
Historians/Historiography” already was incorporated in the debate.  
However, according to the historiographer of Israel, Derek J. Penslar of the University 
of Toronto Canada, Morris views on Israeli historiography is somewhat distorted. 
Morris establishes a sharp schism between a generation of nation builders who were 
adult participants in the events of 1948, and the younger self-critical, doubting Israeli 
historians of his own generation. In this he ignores the establishment of the study of 
Zionism and the Yishuv as a serious academic discipline, and the historiography it 
produced during the late 1960s through the early 1980s. The significance of the 
historiography of the revised labor-Zionist historians such as Anita Shapira and Israel 
Kolatt is conveniently conjured away in Morris definitions.207  
“Israeli historiography is admittedly a young creature, but it was not born with the 
emergence of the new history in the mid-1980s.Rather, (…) the ‘‘new history’’ 
represents a continuation of and response to the generation of Yishuv scholars who 
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came of age during the early 1970s. The new history is part of an ongoing process 
of innovation – innovation which began before the advent of this new cohort and 
which goes on outside of it.”208  
Morris suggestion that all preceding historiography is worthless as sound history 
therefore must be put to question. Previous Israeli historiography might have a pro-
Zionist bias, but it is still history produced in international acclaimed academic 
institutions. If we were to interpret Morris’ remarks about earlier historiography as 
limited to the previous historiography of the first Arab-Israeli conflict, we would be 
closer to the mark, as the revised Labor-Zionist historiography of the 1970s is mainly 
focused on the history of the pre-independence Yishuv communities, and the quality 
of their historiography of 1948  is questionable due to bias. However, the 
historiography of the New Historians can be labeled as a revisionist project, and 
indeed shares resemblance with different revisionist projects that’s going on in 
Europe and in the United States.  
Post-Zionism  
For many Zionists, the New Historians are the intellectual heirs of anti-Zionism.209 
Any criticism of the Zionist project and the Zionist leadership have been perceived as 
an attack on Israel itself and in turn the entire body if Jews (anti-Semitism). This can 
explain why the New Historians have been accused of being self-hating-Jews or even 
treacherous, as some Zionists believe that Zionism is the only righteous road to walk 
for a Jew, and that political Zionism was the salvation of the international Jewry. 
What is certain is that the New Historiography is very critical to the official Zionist 
narratives of the 1948 conflict, which in turn can be (and evidently has been) 
interpreted as a critique of the Zionist project as a whole. The New Historians are not 
the first Jews to be critical about Zionism and its narratives. All the way back to the 
19th century, European Jews took a stand against Herzl’s Zionism and declared 
themselves as Anti-Zionists.210 Today, certain groups of ultra-orthodox Jews oppose 
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the state of Israel, as they claim it is against the Thora for the Jews to have a state. 
One such anti-Zionists organization based in Jerusalem called Neturei Karta protests 
against the Zionist state with posters, called Pashkavils. One such poster reads: For 
the holiness of Jerusalem, we choose Arab rule.211 A less radical version of 
opposition to Zionism is what can be called Post-Zionism. Post-Zionists do not 
necessarily oppose the idea of a Jewish state. Instead they claim that Zionism has 
fulfilled its role, and hence are obsolete as a political ideology for modern day 
Israelis. Instead, Post-Zionists wants to build a liberal state with equal rights for Jews 
and Arabs alike, and put an end to the hawkish policies towards the Palestinians 
under Israeli occupation. Whether or not they advocate one-state or two-state 
solutions, Post-Zionists demand an end to occupation and a normalization of Israeli 
relations to its Arab neighbors.212  
The group of New Historians to whom this thesis is dedicated, is not a homogenous 
group with consistent views. Rather they are a diverse group with different 
backgrounds, experiences and agendas. Some of them would probably feel 
comfortable with carrying a post-Zionist label or even Anti-Zionist, while Benny Morris 
is a self-declared Zionist.  
Positivism and the use of oral sources  
One of the main discrepancies between the new historians, are the selection of 
sources. Benny Morris is a self-acclaimed positivist, which in the field of history 
relates to the exclusive use of written documents, preferably state and army 
documents.213 He argues for his views in the introduction to The Birth of the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem, Revisited: 
“I believe in the value of documents. While contemporary documents may misinform, 
distort, omit or lie, they do so, in my experience, far less than interviewees recalling 
highly controversial events some 40-50 years ago. My limited experience with such 
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interviews revealed enormous gaps of memory and terrible distortion and selectivity 
born of “adopted” and “rediscovered” memories, ideological certainties and 
commitments and political agendas. I have found interviews occasionally of use in 
providing “colour” and in reconstructing a picture of prevailing conditions and, 
sometimes, feelings. But not in establishing “facts”.”214  
His positivist views are not supported by his colleagues amongst the new historians, 
which relies on intensive use of oral sources.215 Ilan Pappé, in his book: Out of the 
Frame. The struggle for academic freedom in Israel, points out the double standards 
within the Israeli academic community regarding the use of oral sources. The 
institutions of the Yad Vashem (Hebrew: די   ו literally means: a memorial and a 
name) which main focus is to collect documentation and testimonies about the 
holocaust, relies heavily on the use of oral testimonies from holocaust survivors. 
These are in Israel viewed as almost infallible sources to the history of the holocaust, 
even when conflicting with Nazi documentation. The testimonies are utilized as the 
main instrument against holocaust-denial, and the Oral History Section of the Yad 
Washem are actively trying to reach all holocaust survival in Israel and elsewhere to 
tape their testimonies.216 However, the traditional Zionist narrative tends to disregard 
Palestinian testimonies as worthless in the writing of the history of the 1947-1949 
events.217 
Benny Morris also disregards to a large extent the oral history of the Palestinian 
diaspora, while based on military records, dispassionately writing detailed accounts 
of massacres and expulsions of Palestinians by the hands of the Jews. His positivist 
approach has thus earned him both criticism and respect. Avi Shlaim, a colleague 
and fellow New Historian, was having an argument with Morris in the aftermath of the 
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Al Aqsa uprising in 2000, as Morris took a drastic turn to the right in Israeli politics, 
publishing articles in newspapers titled “the Arabs are to blame” and so on. The 
following are a passage from the interview I conducted with professor Shlaim in May 
2012:  
“The problems started after he suddenly and radically changed his views about the 
Arab- Palestinian conflict, and put all the blame on the Palestinians. I thought it was 
shocking, because he was a positivistic historian. He believes only in written records 
and he doesn’t believe in interviews. I use oral history intensively. Not as a substitute, 
but as a supplement to the written records. But he is much more of a purist. Only 
official documents, only written records count. All of a sudden, he makes all this 
sweeping statements: “All Palestinians are liars”, “All Palestinian leaders are liars”. 
“Arafat is a liar”. “When they signed the Oslo-accord, they didn’t really mean it, it is 
part of the theory of stages. By stages they’ll eliminate the state of Israel, and this an 
interstagial conflict.” That was when we had an intellectual argument. (…) I don’t like 
his views because they are not based on evidence. He has no evidence for his new 
right wing views. ”218 
Another main point of criticism against Morris is the fact that he does not speak 
Arabic, and therefore must rely solely on the Israeli descriptions of events, which is 
problematic. The trends of historiography around the world are shifting in the favor of 
oral history, especially in the United States with the establishment of centers for 
studies in oral history.219 The tradition of relying on oral testimonies from holocaust 
survivors would also be well known by Morris. Therefore one can only speculate 
about the reasons for Morris' steadfastness on the positivist agenda while dealing 
with the history of the Nakba, while leaving the purist, positivist viewpoint altogether 
when he is commenting on the present conflict with the Palestinians. However, as the 
state archives of the Arab nations at large are closed, a positivist approach might be 
convenient if one wish to avoid further criticism about lacking language-skills. By 
avoiding the oral history, Morris is mainly left with the sources of the Israeli, British 
and American archives, which he has studied intensively.  
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Chapter 5: Concessions, controversy and criticism.  
This chapter is an attempt to answer my research question: Why did the New 
Historiography cause such fierce reactions? In this chapter I will also tell the story of 
the personal repercussions experienced by Morris and Pappé in the wake of their 
critical view at Israeli history. First: the story of Benny Morris from where we left him 
after the publishing of The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem in 1988.   
What’s eating Benny Morris?  
Personal repercussions 
Benny Morris, being an Israeli citizen, did reservist duty during the 1982 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon. He did reservist duty again in 1986, but in 1988 amidst the 
controversy of his book he was called in for duty on the West Bank during the First 
Intifada. He then refused, seeing the Intifada as a legitimate uprising against Israeli 
occupation and was jailed for three weeks.220 In the aftermath of the New 
Historiography, Benny Morris became an ardent supporter of the Oslo-Peace 
process, and his works provided arguments for the Palestinian side and helped the 
two sides to approach a common perception of the origins of the Palestinian Refugee 
Problem. However, as a direct consequence following the controversy of his book 
The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, Benny Morris was left unemployed for 
several years, refused by the Israeli academic institutions. This lasted until the 
personal intervention by Israeli President Ezer Weismann which gave him a position 
at Be’er Sheva University in 1997.221 This was despite the fact that he had written 
several books published by renowned academic institutions like Cambridge 
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University Press,222 and were given references from notable scholars such as Avi 
Shlaim at the University of Oxford.223  
The ideological reorientation of Benny Morris  
Morris’ project of exposing the atrocities of the IDF during the first Arab-Israeli 
conflict, led the left-wing historians and commentators to believe that Morris also 
belonged firmly in the post-Zionistic camp. However, after the collapse of the Oslo 
Peace Process and during the violent second Palestinian Intifada, Morris underwent 
an ideological transformation. He started blaming the entire conflict on the Arabs, and 
re-interpreted the history of the Palestinian resistance as an Islamic jihadist 
movement which had the total annihilation of Israel as its goal. He re-interpreted his 
own findings into a neo-Zionistic224 framework, and justified the cleansing operations 
during the 1947-1949 conflict as necessary for the establishment of the Jewish state.  
In a 2004 interview in Haaretz,225 where Morris states that David Ben-Gurion was a 
‘transferist’, he also argues that Ben-Gurion should have pushed further in 1949 and 
strived for cleansing the whole of the Palestinian mandate for Arabs, including the 
West Bank and Gaza. The most controversial part of the interview is still his 
prophecies of the necessity of a second Nakba to solve the Israeli issues with the 
Israeli-Arabs and the Palestinians on the West-Bank and Gaza once and for all. He 
foresees that such a policy might become feasible in the event of a future major 
conflict between Israel and Iran.225 In the same interview, he explains his own 
conversion:  
“My turning point began after 2000. I wasn't a great optimist even before that. True, I 
always voted Labor or Meretz or Sheli [a dovish party of the late 1970s], and in 1988 
I refused to serve in the territories and was jailed for it, but I always doubted the 
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intentions of the Palestinians. The events of Camp David and what followed in their 
wake turned the doubt into certainty. When the Palestinians rejected the proposal of 
[Prime Minister Ehud] Barak in July 2000 and the Clinton proposal in December 
2000, I understood that they are unwilling to accept the two-state solution. They want 
it all. Lod and Acre and Jaffa.»226  
New Historians Ilan Pappé and Avi Shlaim have described the manner of Morris 
defection from the post-Zionistic project as pathological. Shlaim has said it was "a 
psychological process - the suicide bombings, the violence - that sent him off the 
rails.”  
"There are two Benny Morrises," he says. "There is the first-rate archival historian 
whose work is of utmost importance in understanding the Israeli-Arab conflict. And 
there is the third-rate political analyst who has little understanding of what is driving 
the modern conflict."227   
In the aftermath of Morris’ defection, the critics of the New Historians have had a field 
day. Even Government sponsored institutions such as the Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs has lashed out on the New Historiography based on the shift in Morris 
views. They exploit Morris admissions for ignoring certain sources and angles as 
proof that the entire New Historiography is a hoax, issued by anti-Zionists with a 
political agenda.228 It is thus a fair assessment that Morris’ defection has hurt the 
perception of the New Historiography significantly, mostly so in Israel. He remains a 
controversial figure, both within the collegium of the new historians for his justification 
of the atrocities during the Nakba, as well as his dystopian political analysis.229 In the 
Israeli scholarship his historical research and especially the notion of the policy of 
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transfer is still disputed.230 
 
Benny Morris has produced several books during his career. These include: One 
State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict (Yale University Press, 
2010), 1948 (Yale University Press, 2008), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee 
Problem Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2004), Righteous Victims: A history 
of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998 (Vintage, 2002), Israel’s Border Wars, 1949-
1954 (Oxford University Press, 1997), 1948 and after (Oxford University Press, 
1990), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Cambridge University Press, 
1988) 
Ilan Pappé, controversy and exile 
Upon finishing his dissertation, Pappé went back to Haifa to a position as senior 
lecturer in the department of Middle Eastern History and the Department of Political 
Science in Haifa University, a position he held until 2006. At the very start of his 
career, he held a course in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There he met an 
older student named Teddy Katz. He was a real Kibbutznic231, and saw the study of 
history as just another way of contributing to his community. Being in no hurry, the 
older student developed over the years a master thesis on the history of the Arab 
villages that was captured by the Israelis in 1948 along what today is the highway nr. 
2 between Tel Aviv and Haifa. The thesis passed at the University and received a 
97% score. One of the chapters in the thesis dealt with the Arab village of Tantura, 
which was occupied by Jewish forces on the 22nd of May 1948. From the evidence 
that he collected, Katz concluded that a large number of villagers were killed during 
the occupation, possible up to 225. 20 had died during the attack, while the 
remaining were killed after the village had surrendered, being unarmed. However, he 
did not use the word “massacre” in his thesis.232   
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By 2000, the thesis was discovered by a local journalist who wrote an essay based 
on the thesis. This spurred public attention, and journalists started asking questions 
to the now aging members of the Alexandroni Brigade which was the unit of the 
Haganah that had attacked Tantura and the neighboring villages. But rather than the 
usual questions about heroism, they were now asked questions about expulsion and 
massacre. The veterans of the Alexandroni brigade then decided to sue Katz for 1 
million shekel233 for libel. Katz beseeched the University for support, but the 
University administration refused to accept any responsibility for his research. Pappé, 
although not having been Katz supervisor, decided to involve himself and publically 
supported Katz. He investigated the evidence collected by Katz and concluded that 
they were solid enough to support the claims of killings of the unarmed villagers of 
Tantura.  By then the second intifada erupted, and both the court case and the 
proceedings at the Haifa University took place in the much hardened atmosphere of 
the intifada. Leading up to the trail, Katz received death threats, and underway he 
recanted under pressure the allegations of killings in Tantura, then later reaffirmed 
them. However, the judge did not accept the retraction of the “confession”, and 
closed the case. The University of Haifa thus established a special commission that 
after investigating the evidence declared that the master thesis, which not long since 
had received a top score, was a result of falsification and disqualified Katz’ MA. Later 
attempts by Katz to resubmit his thesis without the misquotations found by the 
commissions were also turned down.234   
Ilan Pappé, being outraged by the University’s treatment of Katz, started to 
investigate deeper into the material of the attack on Tantura, and wrote several 
articles based on these investigations where he was much more categorical than 
Katz on the issue of massacre in Tantura by the Alexandroni brigade. However, the 
veterans did not sue him for libel, ´probably fearing that Pappé would turn the court 
case into an arena for exposing the war crimes of 1948. In the wake of the Katz-
controversy and the brutality of the Israeli response to the intifada, Pappé stepped up 
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his social activism, calling for solidarity with the victims. He thus was sees as a 
traitor, and became isolated at the University of Haifa. Colleagues would stop talking 
to him, and invitations to seminars and conferences were cancelled. Seminars he 
would arrange himself would be sabotaged by the University administration which 
denied access to the auditoriums. Finally, as a response to the explicit criticism by 
Pappé, the faculty administrators banned Pappé from all events under the faculty’s 
auspices. It culminated in 2002, when Pappé was called to stand before a 
disciplinary court at the University. The prosecution wanted him dismissed from the 
University because of his position on the Katz-controversy. His criticism of the 
University’s handling of the case was not within the freedom of speech, but: “non-
collegial, unethical and immoral conduct, lies, bad-mouthing and impudence.”235  
Not long before, Pappé had signed a petition for academic boycott of Israel. This 
became a central part of the accusation of the disciplinary court:  
“Dr Pappe has recently called for a boycott of Israeli academia. His actions threatens 
all members of the academic community, especially junior faculty, because a boycott 
will limit access to research grants and affect publication opportunities in scientific 
journals. Given Dr Pappe’s embracement of the boycott of Israeli academia, one may 
wonder why he doesn’t excommunicate himself from the university that he has urged 
boycotting.”236  
Ilan Pappé thus wrote an appeal to his friends in academia to protest against the 
McCartyism of the University of Haifa, and scholars all over Europe and the USA 
mobilized in his support. One of those who reacted was Avi Shlaim. I will here refer 
much of his letter to the administration of the University of Haifa as it is important not 
only to understand this case, but also gives insight in the role of Avi Shlaim in this 
debate and his views on the developments of the academia of Israel during the al 
Aqsa Intifada: 
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“I write to you this open letter to urge you in the strongest possible terms to drop the 
charges that has been pressed against Dr. Ilan Pappe. These charges are a blatant 
violation of Dr. Pappe’s right to academic freedom and it is your duty, as Rector of 
Haifa University to uphold his right. Israel rightly prides itself on being a democracy 
and democracy entails freedom of expression, including the right to criticize an 
academic institution of which one is a member. The attack on this right in the case of 
Dr. Pappe is therefore a matter of the greatest concern to the entire international 
community of scholars. What is at stake here is not just the future of one academic 
but the reputations of the University of Haifa. Most of the charges against Dr. Pappe 
arise out of the position he took in the Teddy Katz affair. I happen to agree with Dr. 
Pappe’s criticism of the handling of this complex affair by the university authorities. 
But whatever one’s view might be about the merits of the case, Dr. Pappe’s right to 
air his opinions, outside as well as inside the university, is surely beyond question. 
Frankly it is difficult to avoid the impression that the charges against Dr. Pappe are 
politically motivated. The timing of these charges reinforces these suspicions. Teddy 
Katz’s trial took place in December 2000 and the remarks for which Dr. Pappe is 
being prosecuted were made, for the most part, 12-18 months ago. Is it possible that 
Dr. Pappe’s enemies inside the University of Haifa are trying to exploit the lurch to 
the right in Israeli society in order to hound him out? (…)  
 
As an outsider, it seems to me that Dr. Pappe has not received the credit he 
deserves for the outstandingly original and important contribution he has made to the 
study of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He is widely known in the world as one of the 
leading scholars in the field and he is very highly regarded. There is a huge gap 
between his high international standing and his lowly status as a senior lecturer at 
Haifa. In most universities, he would be a strong candidate for a professorship. (…) I 
urge you not to give in to the totalitarian temptation of some of your senior 
colleagues. It is in times like this that real leadership is needed to uphold the values 
of freedom of expression, pluralism, and tolerance that are so crucial to our 
profession.”237  
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As a result of the letters from scholars who had written in support of Pappé, the 
University dropped the trail. However, over the years, the cost of isolation as well as 
numerous death threats and harassment at his home led to Pappé accepting a 
professorship at the University of Exeter, UK. He thus was all but forces into exile.  
Ilan Pappé remains a prominent social activist, and an ardent critic of Israel’s policies 
towards the Palestinians. He is affiliated with left-wing MAPAM-party, and advocates 
One-state solution for Palestine.238 Thus Pappé is a popular lecturer for left-wing 
political groups especially in Europe. He advocates the BDS-campaign (boycott, 
sanctions and divestments) on Israel and has toured academic institutions all over 
the Western World to speak for the notion of academic boycott. In the later years, his 
books have been written in a more polemic tone, and contains very political content. 
In 2013, he is due to come out with a comparative work about the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank and South-African apartheid policies: Peoples Apart: Israel, South 
Africa and the Apartheid Question (I. B. Tauris, 2013).      
Pappé is at present a professor at the Institute of Arab and Islamic studies at the 
University of Exeter, UK. While still at the University of Haifa, He founded and 
directed the Academic Institute for Peace in Givat Haviva in Israel between 1992 and 
2000 and was the Chair of the Emil Tuma Institute for Palestine Studies in Haifa 
between 2000 and 2006.239 Ilan Pappé has during his career published more than a 
dozen books240, and a range of articles241. His books include: The Rise and Fall of a 
Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis, 1700-1948 (University of California Press, 2011), 
Out of the frame, the struggle for academic freedom in Israel (Pluto Press, London 
and New York 2010), The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (One world, Oxford 2006), 
The Modern Middle East (Routledge, 2005), A History of Modern Palestine: One 
Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004), The Making of 
the Arab-Israli Conflict, 1947-1951 (I. B. Tauris, 1994), and Britain and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict 1948-51 (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988).  
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Avi Shlaim answers the critics  
Though he has avoided controversies about his own person, he has not shunned 
from heading into the crossfire of historical and political debate. Although they don’t 
see eye to eye on the question of academic boycott, Shlaim has fiercely defended 
Ilan Pappé from the prosecution of the University of Haifa during the Katz-
controversy.242 He has also spoken out in support American scholar Norman 
Finckelstein after his difficulties with attaining professorship following the campaign of 
Harward Law professor and author of the polemic The Case for Israel Alan 
Dershowitz.243 Neither has he shunned from speaking out against Israeli policies 
towards the Palestinians,245 nor the American support for this policies for that 
matter.244 Shlaim’s position on the Arab-Israeli conflict is a principled one:  
“I write as someone who served loyally in the Israeli army in the mid-1960s and who 
has never questioned the legitimacy of the state of Israel within its pre-1967 borders. 
What I utterly reject is the Zionist colonial project beyond the Green Line.”245   
Fabricating Israeli History 
Critics have attacked the New Historians on the very base of their project: The 
formulation of the myths within the Israeli historiography itself. Efraim Karsh, 
Professor and Director of the Mediterranean Studies Program at King’s College, 
University of London, challenges the formulation of the myths as a whole. In 
Fabricating Israeli History: The New Historians (Frank Cass, 1997), he claims that the 
New Historiography is “old merchandise repacked”.246 That the New Historians were 
just reproducing claims and explanations that were already given by preceding 
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writers and historians years before, and that their representation of events were 
already known in advance, thus the myths does not really exist.   
As one of the fiercest critics of the New Historians, Karsh has himself been 
overwhelmingly criticized. Judging by book-reviews, it seems that most historians as 
well as the New Historians regard Karsh’s arguments as distorted. His arguments 
against the existence of myths are far-fetched. It is true that much of the 
representations given by the New Historians have been preceded by previous 
writers. But what Karsh fails to mention is that these writers either belong to 
marginalized groups and thereby were never widespread received by the Israeli (nor 
international mainstream western) public, nor did they have the archival material to 
back their claims up.   The main weakness in Karsh arguments however, have been 
laid out by Avi Shlam:  
“Evidently, Karsh wants to have it both ways. On the one hand he says that my 
interpretation is old, familiar, and unoriginal, and that I have hardly broken new 
ground. On the other hand, he takes me to task for this interpretation. But surely what 
matters is not whether the interpretation I advance is old or new, original or 
unoriginal, pervasive or peripheral, but whether it is sound or not.”247  
Efraim Karsh in an article in The Middle East quarterly in September 1996 claims that 
Shlaim debunks his own argument in his conclusion of The Collusion: 248 
“Britain was careful not to get involved in active collusion with Abdullah in frustrating 
the United Nations partition scheme and gave only implicit agreement to Abdullah’s 
plan.  The point of the agreement was not to prevent the birth of a Palestinian state, 
since by that time it was clear that the Palestinian leaders were not prepared to set 
up a state in part of Palestine, but to prevent the Jews from occupying the whole of 
Palestine. One thing was clear in any case and that is that Britain had no intention of 
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preventing the birth of a Jewish state.” (The last sentence was omitted in Karsh’s 
quotation.)249  
These arguments may seem to contradict each other at first glance, but Karsh does 
not seem to understand that while the British did not want to actively participate in the 
collusion, they still can be counted as accomplices of the same collusion on the 
grounds of the endorsement of Abdullah’s plan to occupy the Arab-designated parts 
of the mandate.  
When interviewing Shlaim in May 2012, I asked him why the new historiography was 
so controversial in Israel: 
Shlaim: “I often ask my selves, why are critics so angry? Because there has been 
many historical arguments before, but they are rarely so emotionally charged. The 
question is: “Why are the old historians so hot under the collar”? I think the answer 
lies in the politics of identity. Not in the realm of colleagueship, evidence and 
documents, but in the realm of the politics of identity, in other words: self-image.  
The image is of a liberal, decent and democratic Israeli society. Above all peace-
loving, really dedicated to making peace, confronting a fanatical and deeply hostile 
Arab world. Theirs is the image of the victims. This is in the context of the holocaust. 
Three year before this ordeal, six million Jews were annihilated in the center of 
Christian Europe. That was the huge psychological burden to have to cope with. The 
new ordeal of the war with the Arabs has to be seen, and was experienced at the 
time against the background of their very recent history.”250  
The narrative of the New Historians provokes the Israelis, as it attacks their very self-
image. On the subject of the criticism from the Yishuv-historians such as Anita 
Shapira, Shlaim had the following comment: 
“It’s what Sigmund Froyd called: “The narcissism of the little difference”. I’ll explain: 
Take Anita Shapira: The professor of history of Tel Aviv. She’s sometimes called the 
princess of Zionism. She’s of the establishment. She wrote a book: “Land and Power. 
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The Zionist Resort to force. 1881 – 1948.” So she is a traditional historian. (…) She 
wrote a critique of our books, Benny Morris and mine, in the New Republic. It was 
very hysterical, a very virulent report. And I wondered: “Why is she so angry?” And 
why is she misrepresenting our arguments, and didn’t concede that we had a lot of 
new and relevant evidence that we brought to bear. I didn’t know. Then one friend 
who knows her told me that it is because she regards her selves as a critique of the 
old historiography, of the Mapai version of the birth of Israel. Because she moved two 
millimeters from the intellectual mainstream. –She- did the revision, and there was no 
need for us to come to do any further revisions. So she thought our work was an 
attack on her and what we were doing was totally unnecessary, because she already 
had the balanced view and didn’t accept all the myths. But I think she does live in a 
world of her own. She is completely cut off from the reality of Israel’s treatment of the 
Palestinians.”251 
Interestingly, Shlaim believes that the generation of Yishiv-historians, which I have 
called revisionist-Zionists historians earlier in this thesis are angry at the New 
Historians for claiming the role of the revisionists.  
Shlaim has spoken out for the need of a synthesis of Israeli Historiography that unites 
the perspectives of the Zionist historiography with that of the New Historians.  
Shlaim’s books include: Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations 
(2009), Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (2007), The Iron 
Wall, Israel and the Arab World (2001), The Cold War and the Middle East (co-editor, 
1997), War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History (1995), and Collusion 
Across the Jordan: King Abdulla and the Zionist Movement (1988).   
 
The Oslo peace-process 
The New Historians, and especially Benny Morris’ The Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem, have been accredited with laying the grounds for the Oslo Peace 
Process. Although important for the establishing of a common understanding of the 
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origins of the refugee problem, the importance of the New Historian for the initial 
process might be somewhat overrated.252   
The first round of the Oslo Peace Process started as secret negotiations between 
Palestinian and Israeli delegates that were ultimately brought to the top level, and 
resulted in the signing of Oslo I. The agreement that was successfully kept outside of 
the media’s glare, took the world by surprise, and established Palestinian autonomy 
in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians leader Yassir Arafat was also 
allowed to return to Palestine, and the parties were mutually recognizing each other 
for the first time. The negotiators had deliberately postponed several of the key 
issues of Palestinian-Israeli relations, including the refugee problem, the future for 
Palestinian sovereignty, and the status of Jerusalem.253  
It was not until the peace-talks at Camp David in July 2000 that these issues were on 
the table, and the writings of the New Historians became influential on the 
negotiations. It was primarily The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem by Benny 
Morris that was the subject of debate. Avi Shlaim has the following view of the matter: 
The Foreign Minister of Israel at that time was Shlomo Ben-Ami, who is a historian. 
He did a PhD at St. Andrews College of Oxford, and was a professor of history in the 
University of Tel Aviv prior to becoming Foreign Minister. He asked Labor Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak to admit a share of the moral responsibility for creating the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem, because he understood the importance of establishing 
a common ground of understanding between the parties, a common narrative. The 
Palestinians are the defeated party, and it is a lot harder for them to accept 
responsibility and to accept criticism than the victors. Shlomo Ben-Ami suggested 
that Israel should take the first step and accept responsibility, but Barak refused. He 
would not accept any responsibility as he feared that even small concessions would 
be interpreted as Israel having the moral responsibility for the refugee problem, and 
thus they would be pressured to accept return or to pay compensations.254  
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Shlomo Ben-Ami, although unsuccessful in convincing Barak to accept responsibility, 
says that the New Historians were important in accommodating the narratives of the 
parties:  
“The new historians definitely helped in consolidating the Palestinians’ conviction as 
to the validity of their own narrative… the Israeli peacemakers also came to the 
negotiating table with perspectives that were shaped by recent research… But the 
introduction of new and powerful arguments on the 1948 war into the public debate in 
Israel became part of the intellectual baggage of many of us, whether we admitted it 
or not.”255  
The effect of the Oslo-peace process on the reception of the New Historiography  
The New Historians evidently played a role in especially the later rounds of 
negotiations of the Oslo-peace process relating to the resolving of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem. However, the importance of the breakthrough of the early 
agreement in Oslo I for the reception of the New Historiography in the Israeli society 
was significant. In the beginning, the books of the New Historians were received with 
harsh criticism and rejection. However, during the 1990s and the development of the 
Peace Process, there was a shift in mentality in the Israeli society as a consequence 
of the Oslo agreement. Avi Shlaim believes that the Oslo-process was an important 
factor for the Israeli public’s reception of the New Historiography:  
“Yes, a very important factor. The peace seized to be a metaphysical concept, that 
politicians just talks and make features about peace. With Oslo Israel touched peace. 
They made experience with peace. And Yossi Beilin (one of the early negotiators) 
wrote a book which in Hebrew was called: “Touching Peace”, that was the title.” (…) 
Gradually, people thought about it, and some of our findings found its way into the 
intellectual mainstream. Particularly the notion of Israeli responsibility for the 
Palestinian refugee problem. History textbooks were rewritten in line with the new 
history. I don’t want to exaggerate this. It is not so that the old history books were 
junk, and new history books were written that were new history, but rather they were 
less dogmatic. The new textbook said to schoolboys and girls: “Imagine what it was 
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like to be a Palestinian child in 1948 in the midst of this war.” So they didn’t say 
“Israel is to blame, Israel expelled them”, but they opened discussion about what 
actually happened, and the dilemma of the war.”256 
The Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process  
After the collapse of negotiations, the bloody intifada of 2000, or al Aqsa intifada 
erupted, following Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount. This, as we have seen, 
again led to the ideological reorientation of Benny Morris. It also led to a shift in 
Israeli politics to the right and the Premiership of Ariel Sharon. After the election of 
Ariel Sharon as prime minister in 2001, Limor Livnat, launched an all-out offensive 
against all manifestations of the New Historiography. The newly appointed education 
minister from Likud, ordered all history textbooks used in Israeli schools to be 
rewritten, removing all traces of the perspectives from the New Historians.257 These 
factors, together with the trial of Ilan Pappé at the University of Haifa after the Katz-
controversy, created a totally different climate for reception of critical revisionist 
history in Israel.  
Conclusions 
So, going back to my research questions: What is the “new” in the New Historians? 
Well, they are certainly not “new” as in “young” any longer. Paraphrasing Avi Shaim: 
The New Historians went from being young Turks to old jerks. They are now very 
much a part of the establishment (if not in Israel), and Shlaim is semi-retired. 
However, being of a new generation, born around or after the 1948 war, was part of 
the notion of the term New Historians as it was coined by Benny Morris in his 1988 
essay “The New Historiography”.  
As the reader might or might not have noticed, I have throughout this thesis 
abstained from using the term “new history”, and rather talked about the “New 
Historiography” (of Israel). That is because “new history” is an established trend in 
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the European historiography (nouvelle historie) of the French Annales School. It 
presumed to shift the focus from the elite, over to the history of the lives of the 
ordinary people. The New Historians of Israel, does not follow this approach, and the 
New Historiography is very much the history of the elite. The New Historiography of 
Israel is not “new history”, but rather a revision of traditional political history (with a 
possible exception of the writings of Baruch Kimmerling, sometimes called New 
Historians, which is not part of this historiographical overview.)  
Efraim Karsh, the author of Fabricating Israeli History, The ‘New Historians’ says that 
the New Historiography were like a “new bottle – sour wine”, meaning that the 
notions of the new historiography were not new, but were preceded by numerous 
writers. As I have covered in chapter two of this thesis, the New Historians were 
indeed preceded in many of the notions presented, but they were still the first ones to 
present the notions based on solid archival sources in a comprehensive academic 
language. This is what’s really new in the writings of the New Historians: They were 
the first professional historians examining the evidence in the newly opened archives 
and wrote credible history that was critical of the Zionists and their leaders conduct 
especially in the first Arab-Israeli conflict. In doing this they broke free from the 
paradigm of nation-building Zionists historiography. In addition, the fact that they 
were writing in English, were educated in prestigious English institutions (with the 
exception of Flapan) and all had sympathies with the Palestinians, helped the New 
Historiography reach a much wider audience than other Israeli historians.  
No wonder it caused fierce reactions and angry protests. The entire establishment of 
Israel had been taking part in the fighting against the Palestinians in 1947-1949. For 
them this was the heroic War of Independence. Now they were faced with questions 
about massacre and expulsions. The nationalistic narrative was challenged, and with 
it the Israeli self-image of a peace loving people that were only defending themselves 
from a second holocaust at the hands of the Arabs. Challenging the myths and 
criticizing the legendary Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion was in many Israelis eyes 
equal to treason. The Palestinians were the enemy, and Israel had no responsibility 
for the Palestinian Refugee Problem. After reading Morris’ The Birth of the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem, this notion became increasingly more difficult to 
uphold. The anger of Anita Shapira, the princess of Zionist history, must be noted. 
She believes her selves to be the revisionist, but she is still no more than a 
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sympathetic critic of the labor movement of the Yishuv, and hardly credible authority 
on the 1948 war and its aftermath. In her eyes, no further revision is needed, and the 
New Historiography is a nuisance.  
After the 2000 Camp David negotiation where the history of the Palestinian refugee 
problem became an important factor, a lot of people belonging to the Israeli right got 
their eyes up for the “danger” of accepting the narrative of the New Historians as it 
might lead the negotiators a step closer to Israeli concessions towards the 
Palestinians in a future peace-treaty. This, combined with the brutality of the al Aqsa 
intifada, brought an end to the accommodation of the New Historiography in the 
Israeli society. Instead the New Historians became a target and were put under 
pressure. Benny Morris seemingly succumbed to this pressure and conceded some 
of his statements, while re-interpreting other into a neo-Zionist ideology. Ilan Pappé 
were put on trial, isolated and pushed into exile by his own employer, the University 
of Haifa.    
This also answers the third research question: Why was the New Historians 
unsuccessful in changing the paradigm of the official version of the birth of Israel? 
The short answer is that politics and nationalism got in the way of the Israeli society’s 
ability to have a critical view of its past. The shift to the right in Israeli politics following 
the intifada and Ariel Sharon’s election as prime minister led to the removal of all 
influence of the New Historiography from Israeli schoolchildren textbooks. In addition, 
the Katz-affair and Morris’ defection made matters worse. However, the changes 
made in the international view on Israeli historiography were permanent. The New 
Historians thus changed the paradigms of international perception of Israeli history, 
but were not able to shift the paradigms of Israeli history writing.   
The historiography of the New Historians that I have covered in this thesis is of the 
historiographical works I have seen, the most comprehensive dealing with the central 
works of the New Historians and the historiographical context. Other works exist that 
covers the issue of the New Historians, for examples have the New Historians 
themselves written several articles and book-reviews that gives a historiographical 
overview. Shlaim’s article: “The Debate About 1948”, and Pappé’s “Post-Zionist 
Critique on Israel and the Palestinians: Part I: The Academic Debate” as well as 
Morris’ essay: “The New Historiography, Israel Confronts Its Past” gives all important 
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insight in how the New Historians themselves perceive their historiography. However, 
as they themselves and their books are the subjects of this field of historiography, 
outside evaluation is required.  
As I started the introduction: There really is a paucity of outsiders writing in the field 
of Israeli history, and especially about its historiography. Derek J. Penslar of the 
University of Toronto (who has recently received a fellowship at St. Anne’s College at 
the University of Oxford) has written the book: Israel in History, The Jewish State in 
Comparative Perspective (2006). It has a chapter devoted to the New Historians, 
although it deals with the subject rather briefly. It has however been an invaluable 
source for me for understanding the generation of the Yishuv-scholars that preceded 
the New Historians. In Norwegian, the most comprehensive work on the New 
Historians that I have found, is an article by the PhD candidate at the University of 
Oslo, Trude Strand, who in 2008 published an article called “Narratives in Conflict” 
(my translation) in the Norwegian journal for Middle Eastern studies: “Babylon.” It is a 
good introduction, but my thesis is of course more comprehensive as it is almost ten 
times longer.  
In writing a historiographical thesis, isolating what is original in your theses is not so 
straight forward as one might think. There is not much to compare with, and a 
historiographer does not examine the actual events of history as one writing a pure 
historical thesis would do. What I believe is original in my work is the comprehensive 
overview of the historiography of the New Historians and the historical and 
historiographical context. Also, the emphasis on the importance of Menachem 
Benin’s claims to historical continuity for the development of the New Historiography, 
the importance of the Oslo Peace Process for the reception of the New History in 
Israel, as well as the significance of the New Historiography for the negotiations at 
Camp David in 2000, are all perspectives that I believe have been unsatisfactory 
covered by previous historiographers.  
In writing this master thesis, I have learned above all that history is an academic 
discipline that is very much in dialogue with the current politics of the regions or 
situations in question. Writing history is casting judgment on the actions and policies 
of the authorities in the past, and the present authorities might or might not look 
favorably on your interpretations. In some countries, even democratic ones, this 
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might result in unwanted personal repercussions. It must be the goal of all historians 
everywhere to support and guard the right to academic freedom. History is too 
important to be left to the whims of politicians. And finally, I can appreciate that for 
better or worse; history matters. 
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Sammendrag på norsk 
Denne oppgaven handler om Israelsk historiografi, med et spesielt fokus på fire 
bøker utgitt i 1987-1988 og forfatterne bak dem: Simha Flapan (1987): The Birth of 
Israel, Myths and Realities. New York, Pantheon Books. Benny Morris (1988): The 
Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949 (Cambridge University Press) 
Avi Shlaim (1988): Collusion across the Jordan, King Abdullah, the Zionist movement 
and the Partition of Palestine (Columbia University Press) og Ilan Pappé (1988): 
Britain and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-1951 (St. Martin’s Press).  
Disse bøkene ble kjent som den “nye historiografien” i Israel, etter at Benny Morris 
betegnet seg selv og de andre forfatterne av de nevnte bøkene som “nye historikere”. 
Disse historikerne har til felles et kritisk blikk på den «offisielle» historiografien i 
Israel. De nye historikerne tok et oppgjør med nationalistiske myter i den Israelske 
historiografien. I hele etterkrigstida var det beretningene til den Zionistiske ledelsen 
om hendelsene i 1948 ubestridt som den «offisielle» Israelske historieforståelsen. Fra 
1982 endret forutsetningene for å skrive kritisk historie seg, ettersom myndighetene 
frigjorde store deler av de offisielle stats-arkivene i Israel på bakgrunn av 30-års 
regelen for frigivelse av arkivmateriale. I tilegg invaderte Israel Libanon, og 
hundretusener av Israelere demonstrerte mot krigføringen og særlig Israels 
delaktighet i massakren i de palestinske flyktningeområdene Sabra og Shatila i 
Beirut. Dette førte til et nytt kritisk klima også i akademia overfor myndighetene. De 
nye historikerne tok da tak i hendelsene i 1948 da Israel ble stiftet, og hevdet at 
forståelsen av denne perioden var preget av myter. Blandt disse var myten om at 
Israel ikke hadde skyld i at Palestinerne flyktet i 1948 den mest sentrale, og med de 
største politiske implikasjonene. De nye historikerne sa at Israel kastet ut 
Palestinerne med makt, og massakrer og bombeangrep utført av Israelske styrker 
gjorde at resten flyktet. Et annet sentral tema i den nye historiografien er samarbeidet 
mellom Zionistene og Kong Abdullah av Jordan i forkant og under den første Arabisk-
Israelske krigen i 1948-1949. De nye historikerne sier at Araberne ikke var forent i 
målet om å ødelegge den jødiske staten, ettersom Kong Abdullah av Jordan som 
kommanderte den sterkeste arabiske hærstyrken: Den Arabiske Legion, samarbeidet 
med Israelerne om å dele Palestina-mandatet mellom seg, på bekostning av 
Palestinerne.  
Men den politiske skiftet til høyre i israelsk politikk etter sammenbruddet av Camp 
David-forhandlingene og følgende utbrudd av den andre intifadaen i 2000, førte til en 
reversering av resepsjonen for New Historiografi i den israelske offentligheten. 
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Abstract 
This master thesis is about the Israeli historiography, with a particular focus on four 
books published in 1987-1988 and the authors behind them, Simha Flapan (1987): 
The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities. New York, Pantheon Books. Benny Morris 
(1988): The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949 (Cambridge 
University Press) Avi Shlaim (1988): Collusion across the Jordan, King Abdullah, the 
Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine (Columbia University Press) and Ilan 
Pappé (1988): Britain and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-1951 (St. Martin's Press). 
These books became known as the "new historiography" in Israel, after Benny Morris 
described himself and the other authors of these books as "new historians." These 
historians have cast a critical eye on the 'official' historiography in Israel, and took 
issue with nationalist myths in the Israeli historiography. In the post-war period the 
accounts of the Zionist leadership of the events of 1948 were undisputed as that the 
"official" Israeli understanding of history. From 1982, the conditions for writing critical 
history changed, as authorities released large part of the official state archives in 
Israel on the basis of the 30-year rule for the release of archival material. In addition, 
Israel invaded Lebanon and hundreds of thousands of Israelis demonstrated against 
the war and especially Israel's complicity in the massacre in the Palestinian refugee 
camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut. This led to a new critical climate even in 
academia with the authorities. The new historians then investigated the events of 
1948 when Israel was founded, and argued that the understanding of this period was 
characterized by myths. Among these was the myth that Israel did not have any 
moral responsibility the flight of the Palestinians in 1948 that was the most important 
and had the largest political implications. The new historians said that Israel expelled 
Palestinians by force, and massacres and bomb attacks by Israeli forces caused 
such fear in the population that many more fled. Another central theme in the new 
historiography is the collaboration between the Zionists and King Abdullah of Jordan 
prior to and during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949. The new historians say 
that it is not true that the Arabs were united in the goal of destroying the Jewish state, 
as King Abdullah of Jordan who commanded the strongest Arab army: The Arab 
Legion, collaborated with the Israelis to divide Palestine Mandate between them, at 
the expense of Palestinians.  
However, the political shift to the right in Israeli politics after the collapse of the Camp 
David negotiations and the following outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, led to a 
reversal of the reception for the New Historiography in the Israeli public.  
 
